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Abstract
This paper evaluates whether the cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy can a⁄ect growth. We ￿rst build a
simple endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs can invest either in short-run projects or in long-
term growth enhancing projects. Long-term projects involve a liquidity risk which credit constrained
￿rms try to overcome by borrowing on the basis of their short-run pro￿ts. By increasing ￿rms￿market
size in recessions, a countercyclical ￿scal policy will boost investment in productivity-enhancing long-
term projects, and the more so in sectors that rely more on external ￿nancing or which display lower
asset tangibility. Second, the paper tests this prediction using Rajan and Zingales (1998)￿ s di⁄-and-di⁄
methodology on a panel data sample of manufacturing industries across 17 OECD countries over the
period 1980-2005. The evidence con￿rms that the positive e⁄ects of a more countercyclical ￿scal policy
on value added growth, productivity growth, and R&D expenditure, are indeed larger in industries with
heavier reliance on external ￿nance or lower asset tangibility.
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11 Introduction
Standard macroeconomic textbooks are generally divided into two largely separate parts: the analysis of
long-run growth, which at best is linked to structural characteristics of the economy (education, R&D,
openness to trade, ￿nancial development); and the short term analysis, which emphasizes the short-term
e⁄ects of productivity or demand shocks and the e⁄ects of macroeconomic policies (￿scal and/or monetary)
aimed at stabilizing the economy. Yet, recently the view that short-run stabilization policies should have
no signi￿cant impact on long run growth, has been challenged by several empirical papers, notably Ramey
and Ramey (1995) who ￿nd a negative correlation in cross-country regression between volatility and long-
run growth.1 More recently, using a Schumpeterian growth framework, Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and
Manova (2008) (henceforth AABM) have argued that higher macroeconomic volatility a⁄ects the composition
of ￿rms￿investments and in particular pushes towards more pro-cyclical R&D investments in ￿rms that are
more credit constrained.
This paper goes one step further by analyzing the e⁄ect of a more countercyclical ￿scal policy on in-
dustry growth, depending upon the ￿nancial constraints faced by the industry2. Our basic purpose is two
fold. It is ￿rst to show that the link between volatility and growth is not only structural: macroeconomic
policies that a⁄ects the former also a⁄ect the latter. Second, we want to argue that even if the impact of
a countercyclical ￿scal stimulus policy on aggregate GDP may be limited in the short-run, there may be
economically signi￿cant gains from such a policy in terms of long-run growth.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we build a simple model to illustrate how the cyclical component
of ￿scal policy can a⁄ect growth in sectors that are more or less ￿nancially constrained. Second, we use cross
industry/cross-country panel data to test our main theoretical predictions, and provide empirical evidence
of a more positive and signi￿cant impact of stabilizing ￿scal policy on industry growth in more ￿nancially
constrained industries.
1Additional evidence can be found in the work of Bruno (1993) on in￿ation and growth, of Hausman and Gavin (1996) for
Latin American countries, or more recently Imbs (2007)
2Showing that a more countercyclical ￿scal policy has a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on industry growth in more ￿nancially
constrained industries, would also point to a welfare e⁄ect of such a policy that should go well beyond the welfare improvement
pointed out by Lucas (1987): in his model with exogenous growth, the welfare gains from stabilization only, are welfare
equivalent to a very modest increase in long-run growth.
2In our model, ￿scal policy impacts on long-run growth by a⁄ecting how much more investment is di-
rected towards productivity enhancing activity. More speci￿cally, as in AABM, ￿rms choose to direct their
investment either towards short-run projects that do not increase the stock of knowledge in the economy, or
towards productivity enhancing long-term projects. The completion of long-term innovative projects is in
turn subject to a liquidity risk: namely, such projects can only implemented if the ￿rm overcome a liquidity
shock that may occur during the interim period. Consequently, credit constrained ￿rms may also choose to
invest in the short-run project in order to generate cash-￿ ow revenues which will subsequently help them
overcome the liquidity shock. The aggregate business cycle interferes with ￿rms￿decision whether to invest
more in long-term innovative projects, through a market size e⁄ect: namely, the market size for both long-
term and short-term projects is lower during a recession than during a boom. Current market size does
not a⁄ect the allocation of investment between long-run and short-run projects as much as expected future
market size a⁄ects long-term investment.3 This, together with the assumption that a recession is more likely
to occur tomorrow if it is already occurring today, implies: ￿rst, that ￿rms will engage less in long-term
productivity-enhancing investments during recessions than during booms; second, that a policy which com-
mits to increase market-size by the time long-term projects are to be completed, induces ￿rm to increase
long-term investment. This e⁄ect is stronger the lower the market-size prior to government intervention
and also the more credit-constrained ￿rms are. Consequently, a countercyclical policy increases productivity
growth, the higher the share of investment ￿nanced through external capital (which in the model is proxied
by the size of the liquidity shock) and the lower asset tangibility.
In the second part of the paper we test the main prediction of the model, namely that a countercyclical
￿scal policy increases productivity growth, the higher the share of investment ￿nanced through external
capital (which in the model is proxied by the size of the liquidity shock) and the lower asset tangibility.
A simple approach to assessing the impact of countercyclical economic policies on growth, would be
to regress growth outcomes (e.g output or labour productivity growth) on some indicator which re￿ ects
3A higher market size today, has two counteracting e⁄ects on investment composition. On the one hand it encourages
higher short-term investment since these will yield higher short-run pro￿ts. On the other hand, it encourages higher long term
investment since the higher cash-￿ow induced by the increased market size in the short run, will also help credit-constrained
￿rms overcome interim liquidity shocks and thereby complete their long term projects.
3the degree of countercyclicality of ￿scal policy and the interaction between this indicator and a measure
of credit constraints. Everything else remaining equal, such an approach should tell us for example about
how much extra growth can be expected from moving say from a more to a less procyclical ￿scal policy.
However, there are at least three important issues that preclude a proper interpretation of this type of
straightforward exercise. First, the cyclicality of (￿scal) policy is typically captured by a unique time-
invariant parameter which only varies across countries. As a result, standard cross-country panel regression
cannot be used to assess to the e⁄ect of the cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy on growth in as much as the
former is perfectly collinear to the ￿xed e⁄ect that is traditionally introduced to control for unobserved
cross-country heterogeneity. 4 Second, the causality issue -does a positive correlation between ￿scal policy
countercyclicality and growth re￿ ect the e⁄ect of ￿scal policy cyclicality on growth or the e⁄ect of growth on
the cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy- cannot be properly addressed while maintaining the analysis at a pure
macroeconomic level.5 But then, how can we use the results from the regression analysis to estimate the
growth gain/loss from a change in the cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy and then draw policy implications? 6
A ￿nal concern is identi￿cation: a cross-country panel regression, particularly one which is restricted to a
small cross-country sample, is unlikely to be robust to the inclusion of additional control variables re￿ ecting
alternative stories. Thus, even if cross-country panel regressions may point at correlations between the
cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy and growth, the channel through which this correlation works is not likely to
be well identi￿ed by a pure country level analysis.
The approach we follow in this paper allows us to address each of the above issues. More speci￿cally,
we follow the methodology developed in the seminal paper by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and use cross-
industry/cross-country panel data on a sample of 17 OECD countries over the overall period 1980-2005, to
test whether industry growth is positively a⁄ected by the interaction between ￿scal policy cyclicality (which
4To solve this issue, Aghion and Marinescu (2007) introduce time-varying estimates of ￿scal policy cyclicality. While this
helps controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, it comes at the cost of loosing precision in the estimates of ￿scal policy cyclicality.
5One particular reason for this, is that ￿scal policy cyclicality is used in growth regressions as a right hand side variable
meanwhile the estimation of time-varying ￿scal policy cyclicality requires using the full data sample. See Aghion and Marinescu
(2007).
6One answer to this problem would be to use instrumental variables. However cross-country panel IV regressions typically
use internal instruments, i.e. lagged values of right hand side variables. In the case of time-varying estimates of ￿scal policy
cyclicality, this boils down to using forward information as instruments, in which case instruments cannot be exogenous.
4is computed at country level for all countries in the sample) and industry level external ￿nancial dependence
or asset tangibility (which are computed for each corresponding industry in the US). That this approach
helps us overcome the three issues stated above, follows from the following considerations: ￿rst, even though
we estimate the countercyclicality of ￿scal policy at country level by a time-invariant coe¢ cient (which we
derive for each country by regressing various indicators of ￿scal policy on the output gap in this country over a
given time period), and therefore ￿scal policy countercyclicality in each country is collinear to that country￿ s
￿xed e⁄ect, the interaction between the country level measure of countercyclicality and the industry level
variable is not. Second, the interaction term helps solve the identi￿cation issue to the extent that by working
at cross-industry level we have enough observations that our results withstand the introduction of country
￿xed e⁄ects plus a whole set of structural variables as additional controls. Finally, this approach helps us deal
with the causality issue: in particular, to the extent that macroeconomic policy should a⁄ect industry level
growth whereas the opposite - industry level growth a⁄ecting macroeconomic policy- is less likely to hold,
￿nding a positive and signi￿cant interaction coe¢ cient in the growth regressions, is informative as to whether
the cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy indeed has a causal impact on growth.7 However, there is a downside
to the industry level investigation: namely, our di⁄erence in di⁄erence analysis has little to say about the
magnitude of the macroeconomic growth gain/loss induced by di⁄erent patterns of cyclicality in ￿scal policy.
At best, our empirical estimates provide qualitative evidence of the growth e⁄ect of countercyclical ￿scal
policy.8
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, ￿scal policy countercyclicality - measured
as the sensitivity of a country￿ s total or primary ￿scal balance (relative to GDP) to time variations in
its output gap - has a positive signi￿cant and robust impact on industry growth, the higher the extent
to which the corresponding industry in the US relies on external ￿nance, or the lower asset tangibility of
7Fiscal policy cyclicality could be endogenous to the industry level composition of total output if for example industries that
bene￿t more from ￿scal policy counter-cyclicality do lobby more for counter-cyclical ￿scal policy. However, to the extent that
there are decreasing returns to scale (which is likely to be the case in the manufacturing industries featuring in our empirical
analysis), this would rather imply a downward bias in our estimates of the positive impact of ￿scal policy counter-cyclicality
on growth. Hence controlling for this possible source of endogeneity would only reinforce our conclusions by reducing this
downward bias.
8Extrapolating from our results to derive more aggregate numerical conclusions, is further complicated by our focusing on
the growth for manufacturing industries while the total share of manufacturing industries in total value added is about 40%
not more. In particular, assessing the global macroeconomic e⁄ect of ￿scal policy cyclicality would require an assessment of the
impact on the service sector.
5the corresponding sector in the US. This result obtains whether growth is measured by real value added
growth or by labour productivity growth. Using the regression coe¢ cients one can assess the magnitude of
the corresponding di⁄-in-di⁄ e⁄ect: that is, how much extra growth do we generate when say ￿scal policy
countercyclicality and external ￿nancial dependence move from the 25% to the 75% percentile. The ￿gures
happen to be relatively large, especially when compared to the equivalent ￿gures in Rajan and Zingales
(1998). This in turn suggests that the e⁄ect of a more countercyclical ￿scal policy in more ￿nancially
constrained industries, is economically signi￿cant. Second, we show that our baseline result is robust to: (i)
distinguishing between industries with positive ￿nancial dependence and industries with negative ￿nancial
dependence; (ii) removing particular countries from the regression exercise; (iii) adding control variables such
as ￿nancial development, in￿ ation, and average ￿scal balance interacted with the industry level variables
(external ￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility); (iv) instrumenting ￿scal policy cyclicality with economic,
legal and political variables. Third, we decompose ￿scal policy between its revenue side and its expenditure
sides. We then obtain two somewhat surprising results: ￿rst, countercyclicality in total government revenues
has approximately the same e⁄ect as countercyclicality in total government expenditures. Second, when
focusing on primary government expenditures and revenues, the empirical evidence shows that the e⁄ect
of countercyclicality in primary government expenditures (interacted with industry ￿nancial dependence or
asset tangibility), is about twice as large as the impact of countercyclicality in primary government revenues.
9
Our analysis contributes to at least three ongoing debates among macroeconomists: 1) is there a (causal)
link between volatility and growth?; 2) what is the optimal design of intertemporal ￿scal policy? 3) what are
the e⁄ects of a countercyclical ￿scal stimulus on aggregate output? That the correlation between long-run
growth and volatility is not entirely causal, is stressed by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) who point to low
￿nancial development as a factor that could both, reduce long-run growth and increase the volatility of the
economy. More recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) and Easterly (2005) hold
that both, high volatility and low long-run growth do not directly arise from policy decisions but rather
9As it turns out, over the most recent period, countercyclicality in government revenues appears to have had little e⁄ect on
industry real value added and labour productivity growth.
6from bad institutions. However, ￿scal policy cyclicality varies a lot even among OECD countries (Lane
(2003)) which share similar institutions. Thus, the ￿nding of signi￿cant correlations between growth and
countercyclical ￿scal policy in a sample of OECD countries may say something after all as to the growth
e⁄ect of cyclical ￿scal policy, over and above the e⁄ect of more structural variables. As mentioned above,
AABM defend the view that higher volatility should induce lower growth by discouraging long-term growth-
enhancing investment particularly in more credit constrained ￿rms. Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo⁄
(2006) build on that insight when analyzing the relationship between long-run growth and the choice of
exchange-rate regime.10
The case for a countercyclical ￿scal policy was most forcefully made by Barro (1979): a countercyclical
￿scal policy helps smooth out intertemporal consumption when production is a⁄ected by exogenous shocks,
thereby improving welfare. Another justi￿cation for countercyclical ￿scal policy stems from a more Keynesian
view of the cycle: namely, to the extent that a recession corresponds to an increase in the ine¢ ciency of the
economy, appropriate ￿scal or monetary policy that raises aggregate demand can bring the economy closer
to the e¢ cient level of production (see Gal￿, Gertler, L￿pez-Salido (2007)).11 The e⁄ect of ￿scal policy in our
model is di⁄erent: ￿scal policy a⁄ects growth through a market-size e⁄ect: e.g by increasing expenditures,
the government can induce ￿rms to devote more investment to long-term projects, as innovations will then
pay out more.12
Finally, an extended literature looks at the - short-run - output response to an exogenous increase in
government spending or to a tax cut. Importantly in these papers, GDP is usually detrended, so that all
long-run e⁄ects are shut down. Although most economists would agree on the fact that a ￿scal shock should
increase short-run output, there is no consensus on the magnitude of the e⁄ect.13 In particular, papers
10See Aghion and Banerjee (2005) and Aghion and Howitt (2009, ch14) for more complete literature reviews on the link
between volatility and long-run growth.
11Consequently, government purchases needs to remain above the level implied by the optimal provision of public good, as
their role is dual: providing a public good, and increasing the e¢ ciency in the economy (Gal￿ J. (2005)).
12In Barro (1990)￿ s AK model however, growth decreases with utility-type expenditures and it increases only initially with
productive government expenditures. Let us also mention political economy explanations for why ￿scal policy often fails to be
countercyclical (for instance Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008))
13Skeptical views on the importance of the e⁄ect of ￿scal shocks include Mountford and Uhlig (2008) who defend tax cuts
over government spending increases, or Perotti (2005) who shows, based on a sample of 5 OECD countries, that government
spending multipliers larger than 1 can be seen only in the US pre-1980 period, but who does not ￿nd that tax cuts works
better than government spending increases. On the other hand, Fatas and Mihov (2001b) ￿nd that an increase in government
spending (especially government wage expenditures increase) induces increases in consumption and employment. All the above
7that introduce rational expectations and long-run wealth e⁄ects, will typically predict a lower value of the
multiplier (based on the idea that consumers anticipate that an increase in government spending today is
likely to result in an increase in taxes tomorrow).14 We move beyond this debate by looking only at the
long-run e⁄ect of a more countercyclical ￿scal policy: even if the short-run e⁄ect of a more countercyclical
policy was more in line with the prediction of low multipliers, our results point to economically signi￿cant
long-run e⁄ect.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model and
derives the main predictions to be subsequently tested. Section 3 details the econometric methodology and
presents the data sources used in our estimations. Section 4 presents our baseline results. Section 5 presents
the robustness checks, in particular whether the growth impact of countercyclical ￿scal policy is robust to
the inclusions of additional structural characteristics. Section 6 looks at the composition of ￿scal policy into
its expenditure and revenue components. Finally Section 7 concludes.
2 Cyclical ￿scal policy and growth: a toy model
2.1 Basic setup
The environment The model builds on Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2008), henceforth
AABM. We consider a discrete time model of an economy populated by a continuum of two-periods lived
entrepreneurs (￿rms). Each ￿rm starts out with a positive amount of wealth W = wT, where T denotes
the accumulated knowledge at the beginning of the current period, and w denotes the ￿rm￿ s knowledge
mentioned papers use VAR analysis, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), uses a mixed VAR - event study approach to show that both,
increases in government spending and tax cuts have a positive e⁄ect on GDP; they also ￿nd - like Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti
and Schiantarelli (2002) - that ￿scal policy shocks have a negative e⁄ect on investment; note that this does not contradict
our theory which points at investments being directed towards more productivity enhancing projects as the channel whereby
long-run growth is enhanced by a more countercyclical ￿scal policy.
Somewhat closer to the analysis in this paper, Tagkalakis and Athanasios (2008) shows on a panel of 19 OECD countries
from 1970 to 2002 that the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy changes on private consumption is higher in recessions than in expansions.
Interestingly, they explain this phenomenon by the presence of more liquidity constrained consumers in recessions, and show
that the e⁄ect is more pronounced in countries characterized by less developed consumer credit markets.
14For example Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009) use the Smets-Wouters (2007) model and compute the e⁄ect of a
permanent increase by 1% of GDP of government expenditures as of 2009: by 2011 Q4, they ￿nd that the increase in GDP is
only equal to 0.44%, whereas Romer and Bernstein (2009) ￿nd a 1.57% increase. Finally, based on narrative records (political
speeches, Congressional reports, ...) Romer and Romer (2007) ￿nd that - exogenous - tax increases are highly contractionary.
8adjusted wealth. Initial wealth can be invested in two di⁄erent projects: a short term investment project
that generates output in the current period and a long term innovation project which, when successful,
generates production with higher productivity next period. The short term investment project may involve
maintaining existing equipment, or expanding a business using the same kind of technology and equipment,
or increasing marketing expenses. The long term project may consist in learning a new skill, learning about
a new technology, or investing in R&D. Investing in the long term project increases the stock of knowledge
available in the economy next period, whereas investing in the short term project does not contribute to
knowledge growth.
Both, short term and long term pro￿ts are proportional to market demand (see Acemoglu and Linn
(2006)). More speci￿cally, by investing capital K = kT in the short term project, where k denotes the
knowledge adjusted short-run capital investment, a ￿rm generates short-run pro￿ts
￿1(K;Pj) = T￿1(k;Pj);
where
￿1(k;Pj) = Pjk
is the knowledge-adjusted short-run pro￿t, Pj is proportional to the private component of demand, and
j denotes the aggregate state of the economy. The realization of state j 2 fL;Hg capture an aggregate
trade (or market size) shock P; which can take two value PH > PL and follows a Markovian process with
probability p of remaining in the same state in the next period. As is often done in the literature on real
business cycles, we assume that p > 1=2; i.e that the aggregate shock on P displays some positive degree of
persistence over time.
Now, consider ￿rms￿long term investments. As in AABM, we shall assume that after the R&D investment
Z = zT has been incurred, where z denotes the knowledge-adjusted long-term innovative investment, the
￿rm faces an idiosyncratic liquidity shock C = cT; where c is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;c].
Only those ￿rms that are able to raise enough money to pay their liquidity cost, will be able to produce in
9the second period.
Given that all ￿rms start out with same initial wealth W = wT; there is no borrowing and lending in
equilibrium at the beginning of a period. However, once the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are realized, ￿rms
with low liquidity shocks will typically lend to ￿rms facing higher liquidity shocks.15
As in AABM, we assume that due to ex post moral hazard considerations16 ￿rms cannot borrow more
than ￿ ￿ 1 times their current cash ￿ ow in order to overcome the liquidity shock. We can interpret ￿
as a proxy for the tangibility of the ￿rm￿assets: more tangible assets are typically associated with lower
monitoring costs for potential creditors, and therefore to a higher value of the credit multiplier ￿17: The
parameter c re￿ ects for example the extent to which the ￿rm depends upon external ￿nance: the higher
c; the less likely it is that the ￿rm will be able to cover its liquidity shock using only its retained earnings
T￿1(k;Pj): In fact, given the uniformity of the distribution of liquidity costs, long-term investments will
survive the liquidity shock with probability
￿(P;k) = Pr(cT ￿ ￿T￿1(k;Pj)) = min(
￿Pk
c
;1);
which is increasing in ￿ and decreasing in c:
A ￿rm that has invested Z = zT in the long term project and then manages to overcome its liquidity
shock18, will innovate with probability ￿z and then earn ex post pro￿ts
T (E (Phjj) + gj);
where E (Phjj) is the expected (private) market size next period, conditional upon the economy being in
state j today, and gj denotes the volume of government expenditures tomorrow if the economy is in state j
15Credit constraints prevent ￿rms from achieving full insurance against these idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
16See Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999).
17Following Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) or AABM, we take ￿ to be constant over time. Alternative formulations, for
example Holmstrom and Tirole (1995) based on ex ante moreal hazard, would generate a credit multiplier which is negatively
correlated with the interest rate., and therefore typically procyclical. A procyclical ￿ would only reinforce the optimality of
countercyclical ￿scal policy established later in this section.
18The model is built in order to illustrate the empirical results that the more externally ￿nancially dependent ￿rms are the
one that bene￿ts the most from contracyclicality. Hence we want to abstract from other factors that will favor contracyclicality,
which is why we use linear technologies.
10today19: If innovation does not occur production tomorrow is competitive, therefore ￿rms earn zero pro￿t,
yet gj is still spent. We assume that entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and consume all their wealth in the
second period of their life.
We assume that ￿(E (Phjj)) > Pj, so that absent credit constraints and binding liquidity shocks, entre-
preneurs invest all their initial endowment in the long term project, no matter government expenditures gj
over the cycle.
Growth Knowledge growth results entirely from aggregate R&D intensity. If Tt denotes the knowledge
stock at the beginning of period t; we thus assume20
Tt+1 ￿ Tt
Tt
=
Z 1
0
ztdi = zt:
Government policy Unlike private agents, the government has access to costless and unbounded access to
international credit each period before the state of the world is revealed.21 Government￿ s policy is determined
each period before the current state j of nature is revealed, but can be dependent on the previous state of
nature (denoted by x). Government policy therefore consists of a 4-uple sx
L;sx
H;gx
L;gx
H; where sx
j denote
the subsidies/tax that a ￿rm must pay before initiating its investments, and gx
j denotes the government
expenditures next period, if the current state is j and the state last period was x. The timing of government
intervention, can be described as follows: (i) at the beginning of each period, before the state of nature j for
that period is realized, the government chooses its policy (sx
j;gx
j )j=L;H which depends upon the state of the
world x at the end of last period; (ii) once the current state of nature j = H;L is realized, the government
implements the policy (sx
j;gx
j ):
19Our analysis encompasses the case where tomorrow￿s private revenue is proportional, not equal to the expected private
market size E (Phjj): This just involves reinterpreting the multiplier ￿:
20In AABM we consider a variant of this model where only successful innovators (those who overcome the liquidity shock)
contribute to knowledge growth. Below we discuss how our results would be modi￿ed if we adopt this alternative speci￿cation.
21We shall assume that the government can credibly commit to a budget limit. This, in turn, is consistent with the assumption
that the government can borrow more and at lower cost than private agents. Here, we also refer the reader to Homstrom and
Tirole (1998) on private versus public provisions of liquidity.
11Timing of events The overall timing of events within each period, is as follows: (i) the state of nature
j is realized; (ii) ￿rms make their investment decisions, given their correct anticipations about government
policy (sx
j;gx
j ); (iii) liquidity shocks are realized and ￿rms lend to or borrow from one another; (iv) ￿rms
that can overcome their idiosyncratic liquidity shocks innovate and thereby generate a pro￿t next period.
2.2 A ￿rm￿ s maximization problem
In this subsection we take government policy as given and analyze ￿rms￿optimal investment decisions.
Given that ￿rms are ex ante identical, there exists a symmetric equilibrium where all ￿rms make the same
investment decisions, and we concentrate attention on this particular equilibrium. For simplicity we take the
discount factor between two periods to be equal to 1. Then, once the current state of nature j is realized,
a representative ￿rm in state j chooses knowledge-adjusted investments (k;z) to maximize the expected
present value, that is current pro￿ts plus expected future revenues:
max
￿
Pjk + ￿z min
￿
￿Pjk
c
;1
￿
Ehjj
￿
Ph + gx
j
￿￿
subject to : k + z ￿ w + sx
j:
One can ￿rst establish:
Lemma 1 If there is always a positive probability of unsuccessful innovation, the manager chooses zj =
max(1
2
￿
w + sx
j ￿ c
￿￿￿￿(Ehjj(Ph)+gx
j)
￿
;0).
In particular when
zj =
1
2
 
w + sx
j ￿
c
￿￿
￿
Ehjj (Ph) + gx
j
￿
!
> 0;
then government taxes/subsidies sx
j do not a⁄ect the di⁄erence between the long term innovative investment
z and the short term capital investment k: a higher s increases the amount of cash available for ￿rms to
invest, however it does not a⁄ect the relative pro￿tability of long versus short term investments. Increasing gx
j
will instead a⁄ect the market size for successful innovators tomorrow and therefore the relative pro￿tability
12of long term innovative investment compared to short run capital investment.
Remark 1 The fact that government expenditures are targeted towards long term projects is not the driving
force behind this last conclusion. To see this, suppose instead that government expenditures decided at t￿1,
also a⁄ect the market for short term projects at t: This has two e⁄ects on ￿rms born in period t: on the one
hand, investing in short term projects becomes more attractive because market size is increased in the short
run; on the other hand, ￿rms now have more cash in hand to overcome the potential liquidity shock. As long
as we are in an interior solution case (with z > 0 and
￿￿(Pj+gx)k
c < 1) these two forces turn out to exactly
o⁄set each other.22
Remark 2 Whether pro￿ts of short term investments are linear in k (as it is the case here) or proportional
to k￿ (as it is the case in AABM) does not a⁄ect our results: in the latter case, we would then get zj =
1
1+￿
￿
w + sx
j ￿ ￿c
￿￿￿￿(Ehjj(Ph)+gx
j)
￿
-
2.3 Growth e⁄ect of increasing the countercyclicality of government spending
The main conjecture we consider in the empirical part of the paper, is that a more countercyclical ￿scal
policy, and particularly more countercyclical government expenditures, are more growth-enhancing in sectors
that are more dependent on external ￿nance or in sectors with more intangible capital. Here, we show how
our toy model generates this prediction.
More formally, consider the case where in both states of the world zj = 1
2
￿
w + sx
j ￿ c
￿￿(Ehjj(Ph)+gx
j)
￿
.
22Indeed the representative ￿rms then choose k, z such that
max
￿
￿ (Pj + gx)k + ￿z min
￿
￿￿ (Pj + gx)k
c
;1
￿
Ehjj
￿
￿
￿
Ph + gx
j
￿￿
￿
, max
￿
￿k + ￿z
￿
￿￿k
c
￿
Ehjj
￿
￿
￿
Ph + gx
j
￿￿
￿
subject to : k + z ￿ w + sx
j
so the interior solution is still given by
zj =
1
2
0
@w + sx
j ￿
c
￿￿￿
￿
Ehjj (Ph) + gx
j
￿
1
A
13Then, the expected growth rate is simply equal to
E (zjx) = pzx + (1 ￿ p)z￿x
or equivalently
E (zjx) =
1
2
￿
w + psx
x + (1 ￿ p)sx
￿x ￿
c
￿￿
￿
p
Ehjx (Ph) + gx
x
+
1 ￿ p
Ehj￿x (Ph) + gx
￿x
￿￿
:
Now consider the growth e⁄ect of moving from an acyclical policy whereby gx
x = gx
￿x = gx to the
countercyclical policy gx
L = gx + (1 ￿ pL)" and gx
H = gx ￿ pL" (with pL = p if x = L, and pL = 1 ￿ p
if x = H). In other words, we consider the growth e⁄ect of a mean preserving spread in government
consumption, with gx
L ￿ gx
H = ".
We have:
E (zjx)
=
1
2
￿
w + pLsx
L + (1 ￿ pL)sx
H ￿
c
￿￿
￿
pL
pPL + (1 ￿ p)PH + gx
L
+
1 ￿ pL
pPH + (1 ￿ p)PL + gx
H
￿￿
:
Thus
@E (zjx)
@"
=
1
2
cp(1 ￿ p)
￿￿
 
1
(pPL + (1 ￿ p)PH + gx + (1 ￿ pL)")
2 ￿
1
(pPH + (1 ￿ p)PL + gx ￿ pL")
2
!
> 0
as long as (2p ￿ 1)(PH ￿ PL) > ".23
Moreover
@2E (￿zjx)
@c@"
> 0:
23We can see from the above expression that if ￿ was procyclical the bene￿t from countercyclicality would be higher. Indeed,
in this case, under laissez-faire ￿rms would cut long term investments by more during slumps.
14Thus the more ￿rms depend upon external ￿nance (that is, the higher c), the more positive is the growth
response to a more countercyclical expenditures policy.
Similarly
@2E (￿zjx)
@￿@"
< 0
So the tighter ￿rms￿credit constraints, for example because of higher asset intangibility (that is the lower
￿), the more growth bene￿ts from countercyclical policy.
A mean preserving spread of sj on the contrary has no impact on growth, since the equilibrium R&D
intensity z is linear in the amount of initial wealth available for investment. Hence:
Proposition 2 When optimal investment is an interior solution, a mean preserving spread in government
expenditures towards more countercyclicality increases long-term investment in R&D as long as g
j
L ￿ g
j
H ￿
(2p ￿ 1)(PH ￿ PL): Moreover, this e⁄ect is increased when c is higher or ￿ is lower. On the contrary, a
change in s
j
L ￿ s
j
H does not have any long-term growth e⁄ect.
Thus, a smaller expected market size for long term projects reduces the amount of knowledge augmenting
investment. Given that the credit constraint induces a concavity in the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function (since more
long term investment also means a lower probability to overcome the liquidity shock), more countercyclical
expenditure policy will increase expected growth. The probability that long term projects do not carry
through, is increasing in z, and all the more so when c is higher or ￿ is lower. This in turn explains why
R&D incentives and therefore growth will be enhanced by a more countercyclical policy, all the more in ￿rms
which depend more upon external ￿nance or in ￿rms with less tangible assets.
One can show that the growth-maximizing level of countercyclicality is obtained for " = (2p ￿ 1)(PH ￿ PL)
(as long as this translates into positive government spending in both states of the world), that is for expected
long term projects with market size equalized across states of nature.
Remark 3 One could go further and derive the growth maximizing policy subject to the constraint that the
budget must be balanced in expectation - and also subject to some upper limit on the allowed government
de￿cit in each period. In fact one can show that the growth-maximizing policy subject to these constraints, is
15to increase the market size for long term investments up to the point where the marginal bene￿t of government
expenditures (which is to increase the share of entrepreneurial wealth devoted to long-term investments) is
equal to its marginal cost (which is to reduce the entrepreneur￿ s ex ante wealth because of taxation). This
optimal market size is given by
q
c
￿￿: in other words, since the expected private market size is smaller when
the economy is currently in a slump, government expenditures should be higher in a slump than in a boom in
order to maximize RD incentives and thereby knowledge growth. Finally, letting the government smooth its
budget over the cycle makes it possible to have a countercyclical policy in government expenditures without
requiring a procyclical policy in taxes.
To summarize the main predictions of the model: (i) countercyclical government expenditures are more
growth-enhancing for ￿rms that are more dependent upon external ￿nance or in ￿rms with less tangible
assets; (ii) it is the countercyclicality of government expenditures, more than that of government tax or
subsidies, which matter for growth in economies with such ￿rms. We now confront these predictions to the
data.
3 Econometric methodology and data
The left-hand side (henceforth, LHS) variable of our main estimation equation, is the average annual growth
rate of real value added or alternatively labour productivity in industry j in country k for a given period of
time, say [t;t + n] . Labour productivity is de￿ned as the ratio of real value added to total employment.24 On
the right hand side (henceforth, RHS), we introduce industry and country ￿xed e⁄ects f￿j;￿kg to control for
unobserved heterogeneity across industries and across countries. The variable of interest (icj)￿
￿
fpc
t;t+n
k
￿
, is
the interaction between industry j￿ s characteristic (namely, external ￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility)
and the degree of (counter-) cyclicality of ￿scal policy in country k over the period [t;t + n]. Finally, we
control for initial conditions by including the term log
￿
y
t
jk
yt
k
￿
as an additional regressor on the RHS of the
estimation equation. When the LHS variable is real value added growth, yt
jk is the initial real value added
24Although we also have access to industry level data on hours worked, we prefer to focus on productivity per worker and
not productivity per hour as measurement error is more likely to a⁄ect the latter than the former.
16in industry j in country k and yt
k is total real value added in the manufacturing sector in country k. When
the LHS variable is labour productivity growth, then yt
jk is the initial labour productivity in industry j in
country k whereas yt
k is the average labour productivity in the manufacturing sector in country k. Letting
"jk denote the error term, our main estimation equation can then be expressed as:
1
n
h
ln
￿
y
t+n
jk
￿
￿ ln
￿
yt
jk
￿i
= ￿j + ￿k + ￿ (icj) ￿
￿
fpc
t;t+n
k
￿
￿ ￿ log
 
yt
jk
yt
k
!
+ "jk (1)
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) we measure industry speci￿c characteristics using ￿rm level data
in the US. External ￿nancial dependence is measured as the average across all ￿rms in a given industry of
the ratio of capital expenditures minus current cash ￿ ow to total capital expenditures. Asset tangibility is
measured as the average across all ￿rms in a given industry of the ratio of the value of net property, plant
and equipment to total assets. This methodology is predicated on the assumptions that: (i) di⁄erences in
￿nancial dependence/asset tangibility across industries are largely driven by di⁄erences in technology; (ii)
technological di⁄erences persist over time across countries; (iii) countries are relatively similar in terms of
the overall institutional environment faced by ￿rms. Under those three assumptions, the US based industry-
speci￿c measure is likely to be a valid interactor for industries in countries other than the US.25 Now, there are
good reasons to believe that these assumptions are satis￿ed particularly if we restrict the empirical analysis
to a sample of OECD countries. For example, if pharmaceuticals require proportionally more external
￿nance than textiles in the US, this is likely to be the case in other OECD countries. Moreover, since little
convergence has occurred among OECD countries over the past twenty years, cross-country di⁄erences are
likely to persist over time. Finally, to the extent that the US are more ￿nancially developed than other
countries worldwide, US based measures of ￿nancial dependence as well as asset tangibility are likely to
provide the least noisy measures of industry level ￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility.
We now focus attention on how to measure ￿scal policy cyclicality over the time interval [t;t + n]; i.e
25Note however that this measure is unlikely to be valid for the US as it likely re￿ects the equilibrium of supply and demand
for capital in the US and therefore is endogenous.
17how to construct the RHS variable
￿
fpc
t;t+n
k
￿
. Our approach is to measure ￿scal policy cyclicality as the
marginal change in ￿scal policy following a change in the domestic output gap. Thus we use country-level
data over the period [t;t + n] to estimate the following country-by-country "auxiliary" equation:
def￿
k = ￿k +
￿
fpc
t;t+n
k
￿
z￿
k + u￿
k; (2)
where: (i) ￿ 2 [t;t + n]; (ii) def￿
k is a measure of ￿scal policy in country k in year ￿ : for example total
￿scal balance, primary balance, total government expenditures, or government revenues, as a ratio of GDP;
(iii) z￿
k measures the output gap in country k in year ￿, that is the percentage di⁄erence between actual and
potential GDP, and therefore represents the country￿ s current position in the cycle; (iv) ￿k is a constant and
u￿
k is an error term.
Equation (2) is estimated separately for each country k in our sample. For example, if the LHS of (2)
is the ratio of ￿scal balance to GDP, a positive (resp. negative) regression coe¢ cient (fpc
t;t+n
k ) re￿ ects a
countercyclical (resp. pro-cyclical) ￿scal policy as the country￿ s ￿scal balance improves (resp. deteriorates)
in upturns.
Moreover, as robustness checks, we consider the case where ￿scal policy indicators in regression (2)
are measured as a ratio to potential and not current GDP. This alternative speci￿cation helps make sure
that the cyclicality parameter
￿
fpc
t;t+n
k
￿
captures changes in the numerator of the LHS variable -related to
￿scal policy- rather than in the denominator -related to cyclical variations in output-.26 Furthermore more
elaborated ￿scal policy speci￿cations could also be considered. In particular, following Gali and Perrotti
(2003), a debt stabilization motive as well as a control for ￿scal policy persistence could be included. Thus,
letting b￿
k denote the ratio of public debt to GDP in country k in year ￿, we could estimate ￿scal policy
26When data is available, we also measure ￿scal policy using cyclically adjusted variables. In this case, the cyclicality of ￿scal
policy results more directly from discretionary policy. Put di⁄erently, cyclicality stemming from automatic stabilizers is purged
out. Unreported results -available upon request- show very similar to the case where ￿scal policy indicators are not cyclically
adjusted.
18cyclicality
￿
fpc
t;t+n
2;k
￿
over the period [t;t + n] using the modi￿ed "auxiliary" equation:27
def￿
k = ￿k +
￿
fpc
t;t+n
2;k
￿
z￿
k + ￿kb
￿￿1
k + ￿kdef
￿￿1
k + "￿
k (3)
where z￿
k is as previously the output gap in country k in year ￿, def
￿￿1
k is the ￿scal policy indicator in
country k in year ￿ ￿ 1 and "￿
k is an error term. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), when estimating our
main equation (1) we rely on a simple OLS procedure, correcting for heteroscedasticity bias whenever needed,
without worrying much further about endogeneity issues. In particular, the interaction term between industry
speci￿c characteristics and ￿scal policy cyclicality is likely to be largely exogenous to the LHS variable, be
it industry value added or labour productivity growth. First, our external ￿nancial dependence variable
pertains to industries in the US while the growth variables on the LHS involves other countries than the US.
Hence reverse causality whereby industry growth outside the US could a⁄ect external ￿nancial dependence
or asset tangibility of industries in the US, seems quite implausible. Moreover, in some of our regressions
the LHS variable is measured over a post 1990 time period whereas the ￿nancial dependence indicator is
always measured on a pre 1990 period, which further reduces the possibility of reverse causality. Second,
￿scal policy cyclicality is measured at a macro level whereas the LHS growth variable is measured at industry
level, which again reduces the scope for reverse causality as long as each individual sector represents a small
share of total output in the domestic economy. Yet, as an additional exogeneity test, we produce additional
regressions where we instrument for ￿scal policy cyclicality.28
Our data sample focuses on 17 industrialized OECD countries plus the US. In particular, we do not include
Central and Eastern European countries and other emerging market economies. Industry-level data for this
country sample are available from the period between 1980 and 2005, from which we consider three di⁄erent
time spans: 1980-2005, 1985-2005, and 1990-2005. The 1990-2005 time period allows us to include Germany
in the regression exercise.29 Our data come from four di⁄erent sources. Industry level real value added and
27Results presented in this paper are based on the simple ￿scal policy counter-cyclicality speci￿cation (2). Using speci￿cation
(3) does not modify the main conclusions of the paper and are vailbable upon request to the authors.
28Our tables show a large degree of similarity between OLS and IV estimations, thereby con￿rming that our basic empirical
strategy properly addresses the endogeneity issue, even though it uses OLS estimations.
29See the Appendix for more details on the data and country sample.
19labour productivity data are drawn from the EU KLEMS dataset while Industry level R&D data is drawn
from OECD STAN database.30 The primary source of data for measuring industry ￿nancial dependence,
is Compustat which gathers balance sheets and income statements for US listed ￿rms. We draw on Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Raddatz (2006) to compute the industry level indicators for ￿nancial dependence.31
We draw on Braun and Larrain (2005) to compute industry level indicators for asset tangibility. Finally,
macroeconomic ￿scal and other control variables are drawn from the OECD Economic Outlook dataset and
from the World Bank Financial Development and Structure database.32
4 Results
4.1 Main estimations
We ￿rst estimate our main regression equation (1), with real value added growth as LHS variable, using
￿nancial dependence (table 1a-1) or asset tangibility (table 1b-1) as industry-speci￿c interactors, and where
￿scal policy cyclicality is ￿rst estimated using the ratio of total ￿scal balance to actual or potential GDP as
LHS ￿scal policy indicator in regression (2).
Insert table 1a-1 here
Insert table 1b-1 here
As announced above, we consider three di⁄erent time periods, and for each time period the ￿scal policy
cyclicality is derived from estimating (2) over the same time period. The empirical results show that real value
added growth is signi￿cantly and positively correlated with the interaction of external ￿nancial dependence
(table 1a-1) or of asset tangibility (table 1b-1) with ￿scal policy countercyclicality: a larger sensitivity to
the output gap of total ￿scal balance to GDP (actual or potential) raises industry real valued added growth,
30These data are available respectively from: http://www.euklems.net/data/08i/all_countries_08I.txt and
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx
31Rajan and Zingales data is accessible at: http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/luigi.zingales/research/￿nancing.htm
32The OECD Economic Outlook dataset is accessible at: http://titania.sourceoecd.org. The World Bank Financial Develop-
ment and Structure database is accessible at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org
20and the more so for industries with higher ￿nancial dependence or for industries with lower asset tangibility.
Three remarks are worth making at this point. First, the estimated coe¢ cients are highly signi￿cant -in
spite of the relatively conservative standard errors estimates which we cluster at the country level- and also
they are relatively stable across di⁄erent time periods. Second, the pairwise correlation between industry
￿nancial dependence and industry asset tangibility is around ￿0:6 which is signi￿cantly below ￿1. In
other words, these two variables are far from being perfectly correlated, which in turn implies that the two
tables (table 1a-1) and (table 1b-1) are not just mirroring each other, but instead convey complementary
information. Finally, the estimated coe¢ cients remain essentially the same whether the LHS variable in
equation (2) is taken as a ratio of actual or potential GDP, so that the correlations between
￿
fpc
t;t+n
k
￿
and
industry growth indeed capture the e⁄ect of ￿scal policy rather than just the e⁄ect of changes in actual
GDP.
We now repeat the same estimation exercise, but taking labour productivity as the LHS variable in our
main estimation equation (1). Comparing the results from this new set of regressions with the previous
tables, in turn will allow us to decompose the overall e⁄ect of ￿scal policy countercyclicality on industry
value added growth into employment growth and productivity growth.
Insert table 2a-1 here
Insert table 2b-1 here
As is shown in table 2a-1 and 2b-1, labour productivity growth is signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the interaction
between ￿nancial dependence/asset tangibility and ￿scal policy cyclicality: a larger sensitivity to the output
gap of total ￿scal balance to -actual or potential- GDP raises industry labour productivity growth, and the
more so for industries with higher ￿nancial dependence or lower asset tangibility. Decomposing real value
added growth into labour productivity growth and employment growth, regressions with external ￿nancial
dependence as the industry interactor show that about 75% of the e⁄ect of ￿scal countercyclicality on value
added growth is driven by productivity growth, the remaining 25% corresponding to employment growth.
21Finally, we repeat the ￿rst estimation exercise, but using the ratio of primary ￿scal balance, not total
￿scal balance, to GDP as the LHS variable in the auxiliary equation (2). The di⁄erence between these two
indicators is that the primary ￿scal balance does not include net interest repayments to/from the government.
The results are qualitatively similar in both cases: industries with larger ￿nancial dependence and/or lower
asset tangibility tend to bene￿t disproportionately from a more countercyclical ￿scal policy in the sense of
a larger sensitivity of the primary ￿scal balance to variations in the output gap.
Insert table 1a-2 here
Insert table 1b-2 here
This same conclusion obtains when using labour productivity growth as the LHS variable in (1). However,
the estimated coe¢ cients are smaller in absolute value when ￿scal policy is measured through primary ￿scal
balance. This is related to the fact that the cross-country dispersion in the cyclicality of primary ￿scal
balance is larger than the cross-country dispersion in the cyclicality of total ￿scal balance, over any of the
three time periods we consider.
Insert table 2a-2 here
Insert table 2b-2 here
4.2 Magnitude of the e⁄ects
How large are the e⁄ects implied by the above regressions? To get a sense of the magnitudes involved in these
regressions, we compute the growth gain implied by above tables for an industry moving from the bottom
to the top quartile (i.e from the 25% to the 75% percentile) in ￿nancial dependence in a country where
￿scal policy countercyclicality would also move from the 25% to the 75% percentile. Similarly, we compute
the growth gain for an industry whose asset tangibility would move from the 75% to the 25% percentile of
22the corresponding distribution.33 As shown in Table 3 below, the approximate growth gain in terms of real
value added growth is between 1:1 and a 2:4 percentage points per year while the growth gain in terms of
productivity growth is between 1 and 1:7 percentage points per year.
Estimation period: 1980-2005 Value Added growth Productivity growth
Interaction(Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality) 2,36% 1,73%
Interaction(Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality) 1,13% 1,04%
Interaction(Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality) 1,72% 1,25%
Interaction(Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality) 1,28% 1,12%
Table 3: Growth gain from a change in industry characteristics and ￿scal policy cyclicality
These magnitudes are fairly large especially when compared to the corresponding ￿gures in Rajan and
Zingales (1998). According to their results, the gain in real value added growth from moving from the 25%
to the 75% percentile, both in a country￿ s level of ￿nancial development and in a industry￿ s level of external
￿nancial dependence, is roughly equal to 1 percentage point per year.
However, the following considerations are worth pointing out here. First, these are di⁄-and-di⁄ (cross-
country/cross industry) e⁄ects, which are not directly interpretable as country-wide e⁄ects. Second, we
are just looking at manufacturing sectors, which represent no more than 40% of total GDP of countries in
our sample. Third, there is a high degree of dispersion in ￿scal policy cyclicality across countries in our
sample. Hence moving from the 25% to the 75% percentile in the countercyclicality of primary ￿scal balance
relative to GDP, corresponds to a radical change in the design of ￿scal policy along the cycle, which in
turn is unlikely to take place in any individual country over the time periods we are considering. Fourth,
this simple computation does not take into account the possible costs associated with the transition from
a steady state with low ￿scal countercyclicality to a steady state with high ￿scal countercyclicality. Yet,
33Given our di⁄erence in di⁄erence speci￿cation , it is impossible to infer the economic magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients
di⁄erently. In particular, the presence of industry and country ￿xed e⁄ects precludes investigating the impact of a change in
￿scal policy cyclical pattern for a given industry or conversely the e⁄ect of a change in industry characteristics (￿nancial
dependence or asset tangibility) in a country with a given cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy. Both these e⁄ects are absorbed with
our country and industry dummies.
23the above exercise suggests that di⁄erences in the cyclicality of ￿scal policy is an important driver of the
observed cross-country/cross-industry di⁄erences in value added and productivity growth.
5 Robustness tests
5.1 Alternative auxiliary regression
Here we check the robustness of our results to replacing our auxiliary equation (2) by the alternative spec-
i￿cation (3) where, on the RHS of the equation, we add the one-period lagged ￿scal policy indicator to
control for possible auto-correlation as well as the ratio of gross or net government liabilities to GDP on the
RHS to control for debt stabilization motives. On the LHS of (3), we consider both total and primary ￿scal
balance as a ratio of actual or potential GDP. Finally in the main speci￿cation (1), we consider labor pro-
ductivity growth as our dependent variable. Results show that in spite of relatively lower levels of statistical
signi￿cance -which we attribute to the smaller data sample for estimating this alternative speci￿cation-, the
estimated coe¢ cients are quite close to those obtained when using the benchmark auxiliary equation (2).
Also interestingly, we ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the estimated coe¢ cients for total and primary
￿scal balance countercyclicality.
Insert table 2a-3 here
Insert table 2b-3 here
5.2 Positive versus negative external ￿nancial dependence
A further robustness test is to account for the existence of industries with negative ￿nancial dependence.
These are industries for which capital expenditures have been lower than internally generated funds over the
1980-1990 period in the US. For such industries, a more countercyclical ￿scal policy translates into a more
negative (not more positive) interaction coe¢ cient. Indeed, a positive value of the interaction coe¢ cient
for a sector with negative ￿nancial dependence, would imply that a more countercyclical ￿scal policy is
24growth reducing, not growth enhancing. To check the validity of this point, we decompose the interaction
term in two components: an interaction between ￿nancial dependence and ￿scal policy countercyclicality for
industries with positive external ￿nancial dependence and an interaction term for industries with negative
external ￿nancial dependence. If a more countercyclical ￿scal policy is growth enhancing for all sectors, we
should obtain a positive coe¢ cient when ￿nancial dependence is positive but a negative coe¢ cient when
￿nancial dependence is positive.
Insert table 1a-4 here
Insert table 1a-5 here
Table 1a-4 and table 1a-5 essentially show that once we split the interaction term in two components,
respectively for sectors with positive and negative ￿nancial dependence, the interaction term is positive only
for sectors with positive external ￿nancial dependence, whereas it is negative for industries with negative
￿nancial dependence. Moreover, the magnitude and statistical signi￿cance of the estimated coe¢ cient is
larger for the positive component of the interaction term whereas the negative component is not always
signi￿cant. This in turn may re￿ ect both, the fact that industries with a negative ￿nancial dependence
represent a small share of the overall sample, and that industries with negative ￿nancial dependence are
unlikely to be credit-constrained and therefore sensitive to changes in the cyclicality of ￿scal policy. Finally
as is shown in table 2a-4 and 2a-5 below, the same results hold when looking at labour productivity growth
instead of real value added growth as the LHS variable in the main estimation equation (1).
Insert table 2a-4 here
Insert table 2a-5 here
255.3 Outliers driving the results?
A third test is to make sure that our empirical results are not driven by one particular country in the sample.
To check this point we remove countries one by one and show that the interaction between industry level
￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility and the cyclicality of ￿scal policy, is always signi￿cantly correlated
with industry-level real value added growth. Moreover, the interaction coe¢ cients remain relatively stable
across all regressions, which con￿rms that no particular country in the sample is driving the results, neither
the statistical signi￿cance nor the economic magnitude of the e⁄ects. After all, this is not too surprising
given the relatively homogeneity of the set of countries in our sample. And the same conclusions carry over
when looking at labour productivity growth as the LHS variable in the regressions: no single country in
the sample is responsible for the positive e⁄ect of ￿scal policy countercyclicality on industry-level labour
productivity growth in more ￿nancially dependent industries (or in industries with lower asset tangibility).
Insert table 1a-6 here
Insert table 1b-6 here
Insert table 2a-6 here
Insert table 2b-6 here
5.4 Competing stories
How robust is the e⁄ect of countercyclical ￿scal policy on industry growth, and to what extent are not
we picking up other factors or stories when looking at the correlation between industry growth and the
cyclicality of ￿scal policy? In this subsection, we choose to focus on a few potentially relevant alternative
explanations.
265.4.1 Financial development
First, a more countercyclical ￿scal policy could re￿ ect a higher degree of ￿nancial development in the
country.34 And ￿nancial development in turn is known to have a positive e⁄ect on growth, particularly
for industries that are more dependent on external ￿nance (Rajan and Zingales (1998)). To disentangle
the e⁄ects of countercyclical ￿scal policy from the e⁄ects of ￿nancial development, in the RHS of the main
estimation equation (1) we control for ￿nancial development and its interaction with external ￿nancial
dependence. Columns 1-3 in Tables 1a-10; 2a-10; 1b-10; and 2a-10 below show that controlling for ￿nancial
development and its interaction with ￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility - where ￿nancial development
is measured either by the ratio of private credit to GDP, or by the ratio of ￿nancial system deposits to
GDP, or by the real long term interest rate35- does not a⁄ect the interaction coe¢ cients between ￿nancial
dependence and the cyclicality of ￿scal policy. In other words, the magnitude of the e⁄ect of ￿scal policy
cyclicality on industry growth, remains una⁄ected once ￿nancial development is controlled for. Moreover,
these estimations suggests that ￿nancial development is a signi￿cant determinant of growth but only when
measured by the volume of ￿nancial system deposits: the more funds are made available by the ￿nancial
system, the faster value added or labour productivity growth will be in industries with higher ￿nancial
dependence or lower asset tangibility. However, neither the level of private credit to GDP nor the real cost
of capital appear to have any signi￿cant e⁄ect on value added or labour productivity growth once we control
for the cyclicality of ￿scal policy and its interaction with ￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility.
5.4.2 In￿ ation
Second, in￿ ation may also impact on the e⁄ect of ￿scal policy particularly in more ￿nancially dependent
sectors. In particular, in￿ ation is widely perceived as having a negative impact on the allocative e¢ ciency
of capital across sectors, the idea being that higher in￿ ation makes it more di¢ cult for outside investors
to identify high productivity projects: then, the higher the in￿ ation rate, the less e¢ ciently should the
34For example Aghion and Marisnecu (2007) point to a positive correlation between ￿scal policy counter-cyclicality and
￿nancial development.
35The two ￿rst indicators measure the availability of external capital, the third one measures its cost.
27￿nancial system allocate capital across sectors. And to the extent that the sectors that should su⁄er more
from capital misallocation are the more ￿nancially dependent sectors, in￿ ation is more likely to have a
negative e⁄ect on value added/productivity growth for industries with more reliance on external ￿nance.
In contrast, in industries with no or low ￿nancial dependence, this negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation is less likely
to hold. 36 Columns 4-5 in Tables 1a-10; 2a-10; 1b-10; and 2a-10 indeed show that the interaction of
in￿ ation and ￿nancial dependence is never a signi￿cant determinant of industry real value added or labour
productivity growth. The same applies to the interaction between in￿ ation and industry asset tangibility.
Finally, we investigate whether this absence of any signi￿cant e⁄ect of in￿ ation could be related to the level
of central bank policy rates, given that central banks tend to determine their policy rates depending on
in￿ ation. However, we ￿nd that even after controlling for central bank policy rates the interaction between
￿scal policy cyclicality and industry ￿nancial dependence remains signi￿cant. This suggests that the positive
e⁄ect on industry growth of stabilizing ￿scal policies is largely unrelated to average in￿ ation in a country: for
given in￿ ation rate, raising the counter-cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy raises growth more in industries with
higher ￿nancial dependence or with lower asset tangibility. These results however do not imply that high
average in￿ ation is not costly: in particular, a higher level of in￿ ation is likely a⁄ect the local government￿ s
ability to carry out a stabilizing ￿scal policy.
5.4.3 Fiscal discipline and size of government
Third, if the cyclical component of ￿scal policy does signi￿cantly a⁄ect industry value added growth or labour
productivity growth, it is also likely that the structural component of ￿scal policy should play a similar role.
In fact it could be the case that countercyclical ￿scal policy is positively correlated with industry growth
not so much because countercyclicality per se is growth-enhancing but rather because a more countercyclical
￿scal policy simply re￿ ects better designed ￿scal policy or higher ￿scal discipline over the cycle. In the
same vein, the cyclicality of ￿scal policy might be a proxy for the relative size of government: thus it could
36A reinforcing consideration is that increases in short term interest rates by central banks in response to higher in￿ation or
higher expected in￿ation, should also have a negative e⁄ect on industry value added and productivity growth that is larger for
industries with higher ￿nancial dependence or lower asset tangibility.
28just be that larger governments are less countercyclical by nature, in which case our empirical results would
simply re￿ ect the view that a smaller government is good for growth and the more so in industries with
lower asset tangibility or higher ￿nancial dependence. To address this potential objection, we consider three
di⁄erent measures of ￿scal institutions: average ￿scal balance, average government expenditures, average
government revenues. The ￿rst measure captures ￿scal discipline, the second and third measures capture
the relative size of government. Columns 6 to 8 in Tables 1a-10; 2a-10; 1b-10; and 2a-10 below show that
in the horse race between the cyclicality of ￿scal policy and those three measures of structural ￿scal policy,
countercyclicality in primary ￿scal balance is a signi￿cant determinant of industry growth irrespective of
the average primary ￿scal balance. Moreover, the ratio of average primary ￿scal balance to GDP does not
appear to carry any signi￿cant explanatory power of its own in the growth regressions. This does not imply
that ￿scal discipline, for example as re￿ ected through a moderate average ￿scal de￿cit, does not matter for
industry growth: tighter ￿scal discipline should actually make it easier for a government to implement a more
countercyclical ￿scal policy whereas large average ￿scal de￿cits should make it harder for any government
to stabilize the economy in downturns, particularly if the government, as any other agent in the economy,
also faces a borrowing constraint.
Insert table 1a-10 here
Insert table 1b-10 here
Insert table 2a-10 here
Insert table 2b-10 here
5.5 Instrumental variable estimation
An important limitation to the empirical analysis carried out in this paper, is that the countercyclicality of
macroeconomic policies cannot be directly observed: instead, it can only be inferred through an auxiliary
29regression. This in turn raises a number of problems. Among those lies the fact that countercyclicality is
measured with a standard error, so that our OLS estimations su⁄er from the fact that we do not observe
the ￿true￿value of countercyclicality but only a ￿noisy￿signal of this value. One approach to deal with
this problem, is to perform instrumental variable estimations.37 Thus here we instrument ￿scal policy
countercyclicality using a set of instrumental variables which share two basic characteristics. First, these
variables are directly observed, none of them is inferred from another model or regression. Second, these
variables are all predetermined: that is, the period over which the instrumental variables are observed,
is anterior to the time periods over which the auxiliary regressions that determine our countercyclicality
measure, are run.
More precisely, we carry out two alternative sets of IV estimations. In the ￿rst set of IV estimations we
use "economic variables" as instruments, for example GDP per worker, the ratio of imports to GDP, CPI
in￿ ation, nominal long term interest rate, private credit to GDP. In the second set of IV estimations, we use
legal and political variables as instruments: legal origin (English, French, German, Scandinavian), district
magnitudes, a dummy variable for federal political system, an index for government centralization (ratio of
central to general government expenditures).
Insert table 1a12-1a13 here
Insert table 1b12-1b13 here
Insert table 2a12-2a13 here
Insert table 2b12-2b13 here
Tables 1a12-1a13 (resp. 1b12-1b13) show our IV estimations results when real value added growth is the
37In other words, the instrumental variable estimations we perform in this subsection are meant to rule out the possibility that
our above ￿ndings about the interaction between ￿nancial dependence and ￿scal policy counter-cyclicality being a signi￿cant
determinant of industry level growth, might simply re￿ect the fact that the standard errors around the estimates of ￿scal policy
counter-cyclicality have not been properly taken into account in the estimations.
30LHS variable while ￿scal policy countercyclicality is instrumented using economic variables and interacted
with industry ￿nancial dependence (resp. asset tangibility). Three main results emerge from this exercise.
First, whether it is with ￿nancial dependence or with asset tangibility, a more countercyclical ￿scal policy
signi￿cantly improves industry growth, and the more so in industries with larger degree of external ￿nancial
dependence or with lower asset tangibility, in the IV regressions. Second, the e⁄ects implied by the IV
estimations, are of comparable magnitude to those implied by the above OLS regressions: the interaction
coe¢ cients are at least as large and often larger (in absolute value) in the IV estimations than in the OLS
estimations. Finally, the Hansen test for instrument validity is generally accepted at the 5% level, although
some regressions appear to be borderline in this respect. Similar conclusions can be drawn from tables
2a12-2a13 and tables 2b12-2b13 where the dependent variable is industry labour productivity growth.
Next, we consider the case where ￿scal policy cyclicality is instrumented using legal and political variables.
Tables 1a14-2a15 (resp. 1b14-1b15) show the IV estimations results when real value added growth is the LHS
variable. Again, we ￿nd that the instrumentation does not a⁄ect the signi￿cance or the magnitude of the
interaction coe¢ cients between external dependence (or asset tangibility) and ￿scal policy countercyclicality
in the growth regressions.
Insert table 1a14-1a15 here
Insert table 1b14-1b15 here
However, there is one case in which The Hansen validity test is not passed by legal and political instruments
(we ￿nd a p- value at 1% in Table 1a-15, for the estimation period 1980-2005), whereas the test is always
passed when using "economic" instruments. However, legal and political variables always pass the instrument
validity test when labour productivity growth is the dependent variable: namely, the hypothesis that these
31instruments are valid, is always veri￿ed both at 5 and 10% levels (Tables 2a14-2a15 and 2b14-15).
Insert table 2a14-2a15 here
Insert table 2b14-2b15 here
6 Opening the ￿scal policy box: expenditures and revenues
In this section, we push the analysis one step further by investigating the relative importance of the gov-
ernment expenditures and the government revenues components of ￿scal policy in the overall e⁄ect of a
more countercyclical ￿scal policy on industry growth. For this purpose, we replace the baseline equation (1)
by one in which, on the RHS, we interact industry ￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility with both, the
countercyclicality in government revenues and the countercyclicality in government expenditures.3839 Tables
1a-7 and 1b-7 show the results from this decomposition when the LHS variable is industry real value added
growth.
Insert table 1a-7 here
Insert table 1b-7 here
We see hardly any di⁄erence both in the signi￿cance and the magnitude of the interaction coe¢ cients
associated with these two measures of ￿scal policy.
Using labor productivity growth as the LHS variable in the growth regressions (Tables 2a-7; 2b-7) yields
a similar picture: both components of ￿scal policy interact signi￿cantly with (industry) external ￿nancial
38From a statistical point of view, this decomposition boils down to relaxing the assumption that estimated coe¢ cients for
expenditures and revenues should be equal in absolute value since ￿scal balance is simply the di⁄erence between revenues and
expenditures.
39Following the OECD decomposition for government accounts, government expenditures are the sum of government con-
sumption, government investment, net capital transfers, property income, government subsidies, social security expenditures
and other expenditures. Government revenues are the sum of total direct taxes, indirect taxes, social security revenues, property
income and other current revenues.
32dependence or asset tangibility.
Insert table 2a-7 here
Insert table 2b-7 here
As shown in these tables, we obtain similar results whether we take the ratios of government revenues and
government expenditures over actual GDP versus potential GDP.
Now, to gain further intuition on this set of results, we focus on primary government expenditures and
primary government revenues, i.e. we abstract from government interest payments and government interest
revenues. Then the picture becomes somewhat easier to interpret. Indeed the interactions of external
￿nancial dependence or asset tangibility with both, primary expenditures and primary revenues, come out
signi￿cant. However, the impact of countercyclicality in primary government expenditures is on average
about twice as large as that of countercyclicality in primary government revenues.
Insert table 1a-8 here
Insert table 1b-8 here
Insert table 2a-8 here
Insert table 2b-8 here
Overall, these ￿ndings suggest that the positive e⁄ect on industry growth of ￿scal balance countercycli-
cality, involves both the expenditure and the revenue sides of ￿scal policy. That the estimated interaction
coe¢ cient for primary expenditures be twice as large as the interaction coe¢ cient for primary revenues, is
consistent with the notion that ￿scal policy over the cycle a⁄ects industry growth at least partly through a
market size e⁄ect: indeed, the cyclicality in government expenditures has a more direct e⁄ect on the demand
for ￿rms￿products than the cyclicality in government revenues which a⁄ects demand only indirectly through
33its impact on agents￿budget constraints. This intuition is reinforced by our ￿nding of more signi￿cant inter-
action coe¢ cients between ￿nancial dependence and the countercyclicality of government expenditures when
looking at primary expenditures instead of total expenditures. Total expenditures embed interest payments
from the government, which have no direct impact on aggregate demand. In the model developed in Section
2, countercyclical government expenditures have a stabilizing e⁄ect on the returns to productivity enhancing
investments by stabilizing market size over the cycle. Anticipating this, entrepreneurs raise their investments
in long term productivity enhancing projects. In contrast, the potential e⁄ect of countercyclical government
revenues operates only indirectly through tightening or relaxing agents￿credit constraints.
6.1 R&D spending and ￿scal policy countercyclicality
To con￿rm the empirical result that ￿scal policy counter-cyclicality tends to be more e⁄ective in raising
growth through expenditures than through revenues we extend our analysis to R&D spending. Recall that
in our model a more countercyclical ￿scal policy has a positive growth e⁄ects on more credit-constrained
￿rms because it encourages them to pursue long-term innovative investments. In this subsection we look at
whether a more counter-cyclical ￿scal policy has any impact on the growth in R&D spending at industry
level over the estimation period 1987-2005 . To this end we run the regression
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where RDt
jk is the volume of R&D spending at time t in country k and industry j, other variables being
similar to speci￿cation (1). We ￿rst look at the impact of counter-cyclical ￿scal balance on the growth rate
of industry R&D spending; and then decompose ￿scal policy into ￿scal revenues and expenditures.
Two main ￿ndings emerge from this exercise. First, the countercyclicality of total ￿scal balance to GDP
has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the growth rate of R&D spending. This conclusion holds whether we look at ratios
of ￿scal balance to actual or potential GDP. Second, when decomposing ￿scal balance between expenditures
and revenues, we ￿nd that the positive e⁄ect of a more countercyclical ￿scal balance on industry R&D is
mostly driven by the countercyclical pattern of government expenditures, not that of government revenues
34whose estimated coe¢ cient is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This we see as further evidence of a
market size channel lying behind the positive impact of countercyclical ￿scal policy on industry R&D and
thereby on industry growth.
Insert table R&D here
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the extent to which macroeconomic policy over the business cycle can
a⁄ect industry growth, focusing on ￿scal policy. Following the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology, we have
interacted credit constraints (measured either by external ￿nancial dependence or by the negative of asset
tangibility in US industries) and the cyclicality of ￿scal policy at country level, and assessed the impact
of this interaction on value added or productivity growth at industry level. Using this methodology which
helps address potential endogeneity issues, we provided evidence to the e⁄ect that a more countercyclical
￿scal policy enhances output and productivity growth more in more ￿nancially constrained industries, i.e in
industries whose US counterparts are more dependent on external ￿nance or display lower asset tangibility.
This result appears to be survive a number of robustness tests, in particular the inclusion of structural
macroeconomic variables such as ￿nancial development, in￿ ation, average ￿scal de￿cits, to which one could
also add openness to trade or the net current account position.40This in turn suggests, either that the growth
impact of the cyclical pattern of ￿scal policy is of comparable (or even greater) importance to that of more
structural features, or that the e⁄ect of these structural features operates at least partly through their own
e⁄ects on the cyclicality of ￿scal policy.
The results suggests at least three avenues for future research. A ￿rst avenue is to engage in a more
systematic assessment of the interactions that exist between growth and the business cycle, particularly those
operating through the ￿nancial channel. A second question that emerges naturally from the analysis in this
paper, is whether the above analysis of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy countercyclicality on industry growth, can
be transposed from the ￿scal to the monetary sphere of the economy. A positive answer to this question
40The corresponding regressions can be provided upon request to the authors.
35would be all the more important that presumably monetary policy can be more easily modi￿ed over time
than ￿scal policy, although transmission lags may be larger for monetary policy former than for ￿scal policy.
Finally, comes the question of the determinants of countercyclical ￿scal policy and especially the institutional
features or arrangements that foster or prevent countercyclicality. Answering this question will shed new
light on the ongoing debate about the relationship between growth and institutions.
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8 Appendix A: Proofs
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize
max
￿
Pjk + ￿￿z min
￿
￿Pjk
c
;1
￿
Ehjj
￿
￿
￿
Ph + gx
j
￿￿￿
subject to : k + z ￿ w + sx
j:
Recall that we assumed that ￿(E (Phjj)) > Pj.
First notice that the solution cannot feature
￿Pjk
c > 1, indeed if it were the case then the program would
be linear in z, so as we assumed Pj ￿ ￿E (Phjj), the ￿rm￿ s owner would pro￿tably deviate by increasing z
in all points of the region
￿Pjk
c > 1. Thus the solution must feature
￿Pjk
c ￿ 1.
41Now consider the case where there is a positive probability of unsuccesful innovation (this will necessarily
be the case when
￿Pj(w+s
x
j)
c ￿ 1), then the ￿rst order condition for the maximization problem leads to:
zj =
1
2
 
w + sx
j ￿
c
￿￿
￿
Ehjj (Ph) + gx
j
￿
!
kj =
1
2
 
w + sx
j +
c
￿￿
￿
Ehjj (Ph) + gx
j
￿
!
So, if w + sx
j > c
￿￿(Ehjj(Ph)+gx
j) > 0 (zj > 0) and 1
2
￿
￿Pj
c
￿
w + sx
j
￿
+
Pj
￿(Ehjj(Ph)+gx
j)
￿
< 1, the optimum
will be this interior solution (with a positive probability of unsuccessful innovation).
If w + sx
j < c
￿￿(Ehjj(Ph)+gx
j), the solution will be zj = 0 (also with a positive probability of unsuccessful
innovation); ￿nally if 1
2
￿
￿Pj
c
￿
w + sx
j
￿
+
Pj
￿(Ehjj(Ph)+gx
j)
￿
> 1, the solution will feature
￿Pjk
c = 1 so that
kj = c
￿Pj and zj = w + sx
j ￿ c
￿Pj.
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Countries in the sample Abbreviations
Australia AUS
Austria AUT
Belgium BEL
Germany DEU
Denmark DNK
Spain ESP
Finland FIN
France FRA
Great-Britain GBR
Greece GRC
Ireland IRE
Italy ITA
Japan JPN
Luxembourg LUX
Netherlands NLD
Portugal PRT
Sweden SWE
43Industries in the sample
Description ISIC rev.3 code
  FOOD , BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 15t16
   Food and beverages 15
   Tobacco 16
  TEXTILES, TEXTILE , LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 17t19
   Textiles and textile 17t18
    Textiles 17
    Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 18
   Leather, leather and footwear 19
  WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK 20
  PULP, PAPER, PAPER , PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 21t22
   Pulp, paper and paper 21
 Printing, publishing and reproduction 22
    Publishing 221
    Printing and reproduction 22x
  CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL 23t25
   Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 23
   Chemicals and chemical 24
    Pharmaceuticals 244
    Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 24x
   Rubber and plastics 25
  OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL 26
  BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL 27t28
   Basic metals 27
   Fabricated metal 28
  MACHINERY, NEC 29
  ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 30t33
   Office, accounting and computing machinery 30
   Electrical engineering 31t32
    Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 31
     Insulated wire 313
     Other electrical machinery and apparatus nec 31x
    Radio, television and communication equipment 32
   Electronic valves and tubes 321
     Telecommunication equipment 322
     Radio and television receivers 323
   Medical, precision and optical instruments 33
    Scientific instruments 331t3
    Other instruments 334t5
  TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 34t35
   Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34
   Other transport equipment 35
    Building and repairing of ships and boats 351
    Aircraft and spacecraft 353
    Railroad equipment and transport equipment nec 35x
  MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 36t37
   Manufacturing nec 36
   Recycling 37
44Data Sources
Variable Source
Industry Real Value Added EU KLEMS
Industry Labour Productivity EU KLEMS
Industry R&D spending OECD STAN
External Financial Dependence Compustat
Asset Tangibility Compustat
Output Gap OECD Economic Outlook
Total Fiscal Balance OECD Economic Outlook
Primary Fiscal Balance OECD Economic Outlook
Government Expenditues OECD Economic Outlook
Government Revenues OECD Economic Outlook
CPI In￿ ation OECD Economic Outlook
Real Long Term Interest Rate OECD Economic Outlook
Nominal Short Term Interest Rate OECD Economic Outlook
Private Credit World Bank Financial Structure and Development
Financial System Deposits World Bank Financial Structure and Development
45Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.784** -0.795** -0.397 -0.408 -0.811* -0.819*
(0.284) (0.282) (0.458) (0.455) (0.456) (0.452)
6.724*** 6.767*** 5.981***
(1.526) (1.537) (1.831)
6.742*** 6.729*** 6.005***
(1.434) (1.398) (1.767)
Observations 521 521 523 593 593 524
R-squared 0.569 0.571 0.533 0.489 0.488 0.530
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital
expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance
to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential)
GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in
parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All
estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 1a-1
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.515 -0.517 -0.0395 -0.0436 -0.448 -0.451
(0.350) (0.351) (0.492) (0.492) (0.484) (0.483)
-13.77*** -13.86*** -12.81***
(4.544) (4.580) (3.444)
-13.74*** -13.76*** -12.87***
(4.388) (4.385) (3.342)
Observations 521 521 523 523 593 593
R-squared 0.550 0.550 0.511 0.511 0.470 0.471
Table 1b-1
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value added to
beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property,
plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP
Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a constant
and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in
percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry
dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
46Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.598*** -2.590*** -2.387*** -2.374*** -2.235*** -2.229***
(0.492) (0.493) (0.485) (0.487) (0.537) (0.539)
4.960*** 5.178*** 4.994***
(0.796) (1.176) (1.486)
4.920*** 5.121*** 4.964***
(0.738) (1.118) (1.452)
Observations 516 516 518 583 583 519
R-squared 0.552 0.553 0.480 0.428 0.428 0.470
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to beginning
of period total manufacturing labor productivity. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with
internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a constant and the
output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in
percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry
dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 2a-1
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.562*** -2.559*** -2.464*** -2.459*** -2.264*** -2.263***
(0.482) (0.482) (0.462) (0.463) (0.479) (0.480)
-12.78*** -13.84*** -14.45***
(3.902) (4.163) (3.213)
-12.63*** -13.69*** -14.45***
(3.876) (4.095) (3.135)
Observations 516 516 518 518 583 583
R-squared 0.541 0.542 0.468 0.468 0.417 0.417
Table 2b-1
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total
manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and
equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to GDP (resp. potential GDP) Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to GDP (resp. potential GDP) is regressed on a constant and
the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in
percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry
dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
47Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.587*** -2.585*** -2.356*** -2.352*** -2.184*** -2.181***
(0.537) (0.536) (0.478) (0.477) (0.546) (0.546)
3.392*** 4.382*** 4.198***
(0.485) (0.832) (0.947)
3.397*** 4.349*** 4.239***
(0.484) (0.844) (0.965)
Observations 516 516 518 583 583 519
R-squared 0.551 0.551 0.484 0.432 0.432 0.471
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to beginning of
period total manufacturing labor productivity. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal
funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality
is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap
for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage.
Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance
at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 2a-2
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.552*** -2.549*** -2.435*** -2.429*** -2.215*** -2.212***
(0.511) (0.511) (0.456) (0.456) (0.489) (0.490)
-8.059*** -11.02*** -11.56***
(2.514) (2.720) (1.895)
-8.159*** -11.10*** -11.81***
(2.502) (2.719) (1.887)
Observations 516 516 518 518 583 583
R-squared 0.539 0.539 0.468 0.468 0.417 0.418
Table 2b-2
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to
total manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property,
plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to GDP (resp. potential
GDP) Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to GDP (resp. potential GDP) is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses.
Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations
include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
48Estimation Period: 1980-2005 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
-2.073** -2.056** -2.092** -2.080** -2.066** -2.049** -2.089** -2.076**
(0.873) (0.868) (0.867) (0.859) (0.872) (0.868) (0.865) (0.857)
5.041**
(2.133)
5.317**
(2.072)
5.229*
(2.313)
5.242*
(2.447)
5.053**
(2.030)
5.279**
(1.968)
5.174*
(2.288)
5.150*
(2.399)
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342
R-squared 0.454 0.455 0.454 0.453 0.454 0.456 0.454 0.453
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net
liabilities))
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity in each country in each industry for the period 1980-2005. Initial
Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity.
Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990.
Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities) is the regression coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal
balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed for each country on a constant and the output gap, controlling for lagged total fiscal balance to (resp.
potential) GDP and lagged gross government liabilities to (resp. potential) GDP for each country. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-
Cyclicality (net liabilities) is the regression coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed for each country
on a constant and the output gap, controlling for lagged total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP and lagged net government liabilities to (resp. potential) GDP. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities))
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net liabilities))
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross
liabilities))
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross
liabilities))
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net
liabilities))
Table 2a-3
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities))
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net liabilities))
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
49Estimation Period: 1980-2005 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
-2.073** -2.056** -2.092** -2.080** -2.066** -2.049** -2.089** -2.076**
(0.873) (0.868) (0.867) (0.859) (0.872) (0.868) (0.865) (0.857)
-14.74**
(5.221)
-14.48**
(5.271)
-13.24*
(5.885)
-13.30*
(6.270)
-14.48**
(5.034)
-14.18**
(5.144)
-13.29**
(5.845)
-13.28*
(6.167)
(2.399)
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342
R-squared 0.454 0.455 0.454 0.453 0.454 0.456 0.454 0.453
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance to
potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net liabilities))
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities))
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net liabilities))
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity in each country in each industry for the period 1980-2005. Initial
Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity.
Asset tangibility is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total
Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities) is the regression coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to
(resp. potential) GDP is regressed for each country on a constant and the output gap, controlling for lagged total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP
and lagged gross government liabilities to GDP for each country. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net liabilities) is the
regression coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed for each country on a constant and the output
gap, controlling for lagged total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP and lagged net government liabilities to GDP. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance to
GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net liabilities))
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities))
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality (net liabilities))
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance to
potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities))
Table 2b-3
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance to
GDP Counter-Cyclicality (gross liabilities))
50Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.814** -0.826** -0.445 -0.459 -0.900* -0.912*
(0.282) (0.281) (0.451) (0.448) (0.465) (0.460)
7.463*** 7.795*** 8.055***
(1.732) (1.783) (1.987)
-2.773 -6.348 -18.03***
(3.624) (4.429) (5.346)
7.494*** 7.752*** 8.075***
(1.637) (1.645) (1.919)
-2.933 -6.240 -17.74***
(3.577) (4.334) (5.399)
Observations 521 521 523 593 593 524
R-squared 0.570 0.572 0.536 0.502 0.501 0.531
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the
fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when
this fraction is positive (resp. negative) and is zero otherwise. Total Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient
of the output gap when total fiscal balance to GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The
interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -
clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1%
(resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Table 1a-4
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.812*** -0.814*** -0.448 -0.445 -0.900* -0.901*
(0.244) (0.245) (0.430) (0.431) (0.457) (0.455)
5.152*** 6.342*** 6.453***
(0.995) (0.818) (1.395)
-0.766 -4.079 -12.45**
(1.308) (2.765) (5.408)
5.193*** 6.334*** 6.562***
(0.966) (0.818) (1.397)
-0.914 -4.129 -12.63**
(1.286) (2.750) (5.559)
Observations 521 521 523 593 593 524
R-squared 0.570 0.570 0.538 0.501 0.501 0.528
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction
of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this
fraction is positive (resp. negative) and is zero otherwise. Total Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the
output gap when total fiscal balance to GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction
variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the
country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%)
level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Table 1a-5
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
51Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.628*** -2.625*** -2.530*** -2.522*** -2.544*** -2.538***
(0.462) (0.459) (0.427) (0.427) (0.370) (0.372)
6.196*** 6.829*** 7.485***
(1.037) (1.441) (1.512)
-11.72 -17.83** -25.84***
(6.724) (6.040) (4.196)
6.163*** 6.742*** 7.428***
(0.989) (1.377) (1.477)
-11.91* -17.39** -25.34***
(6.703) (5.865) (4.211)
Observations 516 516 518 583 583 519
R-squared 0.558 0.559 0.493 0.459 0.459 0.477
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to beginning of
period total manufacturing labor productivity. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not
financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this fraction is positive (resp. negative)
and is zero otherwise. Total Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to
GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in
parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All
estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Total
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Table 2a-4
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.628*** -2.625*** -2.490*** -2.480*** -2.489*** -2.483***
(0.509) (0.508) (0.420) (0.420) (0.386) (0.389)
4.291*** 5.695*** 6.093***
(0.499) (0.942) (0.958)
-7.334** -12.18** -18.91***
(3.131) (4.369) (5.000)
4.306*** 5.660*** 6.163***
(0.499) (0.950) (0.983)
-7.348** -11.96** -19.05***
(3.164) (4.328) (5.117)
Observations 516 516 518 583 583 519
R-squared 0.557 0.557 0.496 0.460 0.460 0.478
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to beginning of
period total manufacturing labor productivity. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not
financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this fraction is positive (resp. negative)
and is zero otherwise. Total Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to
GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses.
Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include
country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Table 2a-5
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
52Country withdrawn None AUS AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA
-0.814*** -0.799*** -0.736*** -0.769*** -0.814*** -0.840*** -0.771** -0.783*** -0.895***
(0.245) (0.254) (0.243) (0.250) (0.245) (0.238) (0.264) (0.252) (0.258)
5.193*** 5.224*** 5.118*** 5.257*** 5.193*** 5.207*** 5.208*** 5.011*** 5.294***
(0.966) (0.959) (0.967) (1.038) (0.966) (1.161) (0.996) (0.936) (0.949)
-0.914 -0.826 -0.893 -1.029 -0.914 0.141 -1.101 -0.595 -0.983
(1.286) (1.337) (1.036) (1.269) (1.286) (2.416) (1.032) (1.328) (1.232)
Observations 521 489 488 485 521 486 477 490 481
R-squared 0.570 0.570 0.566 0.586 0.570 0.559 0.584 0.559 0.626
Country withdrawn GBR GRC IRL ITA JPN LUX NLD PRT SWE
-0.803*** -0.874*** -0.660* -0.883*** -0.964*** -0.814*** -0.718*** -0.842*** -0.803**
(0.242) (0.273) (0.310) (0.239) (0.222) (0.245) (0.235) (0.269) -0.803**
5.206*** 4.046*** 5.772*** 5.211*** 5.157*** 5.193*** 5.184*** 5.228*** 5.389***
(0.946) (1.334) (0.565) (1.415) (0.951) (0.966) (0.997) (0.981) -0.803**
-0.259 -2.672 -1.116 -1.013 -0.611 -0.914 -0.928 -1.244 -1.518
(1.671) (2.450) (1.150) (1.356) (1.602) (1.286) (1.266) (1.517) -0.803**
Observations 476 488 481 494 483 521 494 493 489
R-squared 0.570 0.564 0.516 0.581 0.570 0.570 0.581 0.580 -0.803**
Table 1a-6
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
Log of initial share in manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Positive Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-2005 in each column for each industry in each country.
The country code in each column represents the country withdrawn from sample estimation. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning
of period industry real value added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction of
capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this fraction is positive (resp. negative) and
is zero otherwise. Primary Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to potential GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in
percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1%
(resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Log of initial share in manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Positive Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
53Estimation Period: 1980-2005
Country withdrawn None AUS AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA
-0.517 -0.474 -0.429 -0.461 -0.517 -0.523 -0.437 -0.483 -0.566
(0.351) (0.369) (0.360) (0.363) (0.351) (0.352) (0.376) (0.368) (0.368)
-13.74*** -13.74*** -13.93*** -14.76*** -13.74*** -11.81** -13.44** -13.74** -12.94**
(4.388) (4.430) (4.422) (4.551) (4.388) (4.583) (4.494) (4.599) (4.521)
Observations 521 489 488 485 521 486 477 490 481
R-squared 0.550 0.549 0.546 0.567 0.550 0.539 0.563 0.540 0.600
Estimation Period: 1980-2005
Country withdrawn GBR GRC IRL ITA JPN LUX NLD PRT SWE
-0.494 -0.754** -0.288 -0.609 -0.651* -0.517 -0.411 -0.519 -0.582
(0.340) (0.309) (0.356) (0.346) (0.360) (0.351) (0.341) (0.401) (0.406)
-13.76*** -10.74*** -13.40*** -16.51*** -13.43*** -13.74*** -13.84*** -14.22*** -16.38**
(4.393) (3.476) (4.365) (4.686) (4.404) (4.388) (4.449) (4.623) (5.621)
Observations 476 488 481 494 483 521 494 493 489
R-squared 0.549 0.558 0.479 0.569 0.548 0.550 0.561 0.560 0.559
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total
Fiscal Balance to Potential GDP Counter-
Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period 1980-2005 in each column for each industry in each
country. The country code in each column represents the country withdrawn from sample estimation. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio
of beginning of period industry real value added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets
represented by net property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to potential GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The
interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in
parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 1b-6
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing
Value Added
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total
Fiscal Balance to Potential GDP Counter-
Cyclicality)
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing
Value Added
54Estimation Period: 1980-2005
Country withdrawn None AUS AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA
-2.634*** -2.488*** -2.581*** -2.625*** -2.599*** -2.606*** -2.625*** -2.631***
(0.510) (0.528) (0.496) (0.508) (0.499) (0.503) (0.527) (0.559)
4.390*** 4.289*** 4.380*** 4.306*** 4.282*** 4.340*** 4.236*** 4.342***
(0.471) (0.495) (0.454) (0.499) (0.712) (0.446) (0.538) (0.527)
-7.322** -7.191* -7.549* -7.348** -11.63*** -7.444* -7.021** -7.317*
(3.174) (3.438) (3.534) (3.164) (3.849) (3.447) (3.039) (3.624)
Observations 487 483 480 516 481 472 485 476
R-squared 0.561 0.560 0.567 0.557 0.553 0.563 0.546 0.638
Estimation Period: 1980-2005
Country withdrawn GBR GRC IRL ITA JPN LUX NLD PRT SWE
-2.636*** -2.690*** -2.146*** -2.668*** -3.061*** -2.625*** -2.623*** -2.653*** -2.641***
(0.505) (0.608) (0.504) (0.498) (0.347) (0.508) (0.514) (0.567) (0.567)
4.279*** 4.138*** 4.631*** 4.500*** 4.061*** 4.306*** 4.384*** 4.367*** 3.940***
(0.516) (0.631) (0.462) (0.537) (0.583) (0.499) (0.461) (0.503) (0.654)
-6.476** -5.238 -6.922** -7.744** -6.078** -7.348** -7.382** -7.550** -7.210*
(2.440) (5.280) (2.718) (3.333) (2.300) (3.164) (3.185) (2.987) (3.340)
Observations 472 483 476 489 478 516 490 488 484
R-squared 0.559 0.539 0.481 0.568 0.569 0.557 0.573 0.559 0.563
Table 2a-6
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
Log of Initial Relative Productivity
Interaction (Positive Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period 1980-2005 for each industry in each country. The country code in
each column represents the country withdrawn from sample estimation. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity
to total manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. External financial dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for
US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the regression coefficient of the output gap when total
fiscal balance to GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap. The interaction variable is the product of external financial dependence and total fiscal balance
to GDP counter-cyclicality. All estimated coefficient are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include
country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Log of Initial Relative Productivity
Interaction (Positive Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
55Estimation Period: 1980-2005
Country withdrawn None AUS AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA
-2.559*** -2.561*** -2.409*** -2.507*** -2.559*** -2.522*** -2.540*** -2.548*** -2.584***
(0.482) (0.485) (0.493) (0.469) (0.482) (0.499) (0.488) (0.500) (0.530)
-12.63*** -12.71*** -12.75*** -13.35*** -12.63*** -10.71** -12.28*** -13.17*** -12.01***
(3.876) (3.841) (3.931) (3.765) (3.876) (4.151) (3.898) (3.978) (3.857)
Observations 516 487 483 480 516 481 472 485 476
R-squared 0.542 0.545 0.545 0.552 0.542 0.535 0.546 0.532 0.616
Estimation Period: 1980-2005
Country withdrawn GBR GRC IRL ITA JPN LUX NLD PRT SWE
-2.582*** -2.566*** -2.181*** -2.577*** -3.006*** -2.559*** -2.552*** -2.561*** -2.593***
(0.486) (0.568) (0.515) (0.467) (0.290) (0.482) (0.490) (0.545) (0.544)
-12.32*** -11.25** -13.10*** -16.45*** -11.47** -12.63*** -12.68*** -12.55*** -12.86**
(3.971) (4.162) (4.115) (2.512) (3.844) (3.876) (3.889) (4.033) (5.557)
Observations 472 483 476 489 478 516 490 488 484
R-squared 0.543 0.532 0.458 0.561 0.553 0.542 0.556 0.542 0.552
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
Table 2b-6
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal
Balance to Potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Log of Initial Relative Productivity
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period 1980-2005 for each industry in each country. The country code in
each column represents the country withdrawn from sample estimation. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor
productivity to total manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and equipment
for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total
fiscal balance to potential GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses.
Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies.
Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal
Balance to Potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Log of Initial Relative Productivity
56(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
-0.373 -0.291 -0.847** -0.842** -0.846** -0.389 -0.396 -0.531
(0.366) (0.347) (0.323) (0.317) (0.318) (0.425) (0.434) (0.378)
5.315*** 5.492*** 4.963*** 4.828*** 4.782*** 6.011*** 6.175*** 5.961***
(1.015) (0.651) (0.734) (0.998) (1.031) (0.827) (1.094) (0.882)
2.387
(5.191)
5.863***
(1.341)
0.867
(1.262)
-0.282
(0.457)
-0.362
(0.575)
-0.181
(0.155)
-0.140
(0.165)
-0.980
(0.957)
Observations 414 387 483 483 483 523 523 523
R-squared 0.610 0.644 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.540 0.538 0.540
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period 1985-2005 for each industry in each country. Initial
Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value
added. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period
1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the regression coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Interaction variables are the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients
are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies.
Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average
Short term Policy interest rate)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average
Gov. Expenditures to GDP )
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average
Gov. Revenues to GDP )
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average
Primary Fiscal Balance to GDP)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average
Private Credit to GDP)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average
Deposits to GDP)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average
Real long term interest rate)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average CPI
Inflation)
Table 1a-10
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary
Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
57(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
0.112 0.264 -0.434 -0.431 -0.426 -0.0198 -0.0179 -0.0387
(0.492) (0.470) (0.405) (0.408) (0.407) (0.467) (0.470) (0.464)
-9.398*** -10.87*** -8.998*** -8.976** -9.763** -12.95*** -14.09*** -11.43***
(2.939) (2.432) (2.770) (3.307) (3.464) (3.396) (3.951) (3.102)
-10.88
(11.84)
-17.58***
(3.043)
-1.924
(3.915)
0.487
(1.328)
0.0821
(1.482)
0.675
(0.396)
0.631
(0.414)
1.243
(2.893)
Observations 414 387 483 483 483 523 523 523
R-squared 0.580 0.610 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.516 0.515 0.512
Table 1b-10
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and  Primary Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Private Credit
to GDP)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Financial
System Deposits to GDP)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Real long term
interest rate)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average CPI Inflation)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period 1985-2005 for each industry in each country. Initial
Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value
added. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period
1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the regression coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Interaction variables are the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients
are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies.
Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Short term
Policy interest rate)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Gov.
Expenditures to GDP )
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Gov. Revenues
to GDP )
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP)
58(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
-2.178*** -2.079*** -2.890*** -2.795*** -2.822*** -2.322*** -2.338*** -2.791***
(0.500) (0.529) (0.426) (0.393) (0.416) (0.551) (0.537) (0.402)
4.134*** 4.487*** 4.710*** 3.834*** 4.146*** 4.588*** 4.606*** 3.787***
(1.062) (0.910) (1.270) (0.897) (1.181) (1.143) (1.451) (0.808)
2.619
(6.002)
5.431***
(1.521)
0.453
(0.485)
0.0189
(1.031)
0.186
(0.527)
-0.0691
(0.164)
-0.0456
(0.172)
-1.104*
(0.625)
Observations 409 383 478 478 478 518 518 518
R-squared 0.583 0.620 0.482 0.481 0.481 0.485 0.484 0.493
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated 1985-2005 for each industry in each
country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to beginning of period total manufacturing labor
productivity. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the
period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the regression coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to
GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Interaction variables are the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated
coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry
dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average Short
term Policy interest rate)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average Gov.
Expenditures to GDP )
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average Gov.
Revenues to GDP )
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average Primary
Fiscal Balance to GDP)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average Private
Credit to GDP)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average Financial
System Deposits to GDP)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average CPI
Inxflation)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Average Real long
term interest rate)
Table 2a-10
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Financial Dependence and  Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
59COEFFICIENT (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
-2.338*** -2.293*** -2.871*** -2.841*** -2.870*** -2.406*** -2.408*** -2.481***
(0.370) (0.393) (0.391) (0.383) (0.396) (0.480) (0.478) (0.412)
-8.781*** -11.03*** -9.843** -8.332** -10.14** -12.31*** -13.17** -11.48***
(2.596) (2.355) (3.872) (3.039) (3.992) (3.976) (4.747) (3.046)
-14.69
(12.95)
-17.75***
(2.864)
-0.378
(1.058)
-1.775
(2.851)
-0.615
(1.387)
0.431
(0.470)
0.431
(0.485)
1.595
(2.473)
Observations 409 383 478 478 478 518 518 518
R-squared 0.564 0.593 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.471 0.471 0.470
Table 2b-10
Dependent variable: Labor Productivity Growth
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Private Credit
to GDP)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Financial
System Deposits to GDP)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average CPI Inflation)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Real long term
interest rate)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period 1985-2005 for each industry in each country. Initial
Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity.
Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-
1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the regression coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Interaction variables are the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients
are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies.
Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Short term
Policy interest rate)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Gov.
Expenditures to GDP )
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Gov. Revenues
to GDP )
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Average Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP)
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-1.086*** -1.090*** -0.917*** -0.917*** -1.129*** -1.135***
(0.301) (0.298) (0.288) (0.287) (0.345) (0.344)
9.980*** 8.361*** 6.912***
(2.195) (1.315) (1.898)
9.778*** 8.107*** 6.919***
(2.113) (1.260) (1.862)
Hansen J. Stat 2.915 2.972 3.797 3.836 5.070 4.613
p. value (0.572) (0.563) (0.434) (0.429) (0.280) (0.329)
Observations 483 483 483 483 521 521
R-squared 0.069 0.073 0.077 0.080 0.060 0.061
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures
not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Set of instruments: GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation,
nominal long term interest rate, private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction variable is
the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level-
are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 1a-12
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
60Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.970*** -0.968*** -0.926*** -0.915*** -1.146*** -1.145***
(0.286) (0.286) (0.278) (0.278) (0.338) (0.338)
4.972*** 6.663*** 5.684***
(1.225) (0.939) (1.339)
4.959*** 6.564*** 5.780***
(1.219) (0.925) (1.338)
Hansen J. Stat 7.762 7.724 3.057 3.239 2.184 1.889
p. value (0.101) (0.102) (0.548) (0.519) (0.702) (0.756)
Observations 483 483 483 483 521 521
R-squared 0.084 0.085 0.083 0.083 0.063 0.063
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures
not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Set of instruments: GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation,
nominal long term interest rate, private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction variable is
the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level-
are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 1a-13
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
61Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.666** -0.666** -0.461 -0.464 -0.708** -0.711**
(0.285) (0.284) (0.302) (0.302) (0.353) (0.353)
-22.44*** -18.41*** -14.80***
(7.227) (4.821) (5.504)
-21.70*** -17.75*** -14.77***
(7.006) (4.652) (5.426)
Hansen J. Stat 4.050 4.214 2.896 3.068 5.923 5.817
p. value 0.399 0.378 0.575 0.547 0.205 0.213
Observations 483 483 483 483 521 521
R-squared 0.029 0.031 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.029
Table 1b-12
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance to
GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance to
potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net
property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Set of instruments: GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation,
nominal long term interest rate, private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction variable is
the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level-
are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.627** -0.627** -0.432 -0.432 -0.676* -0.676*
(0.281) (0.281) (0.300) (0.300) (0.353) (0.353)
-9.283** -13.78*** -11.98***
(4.353) (3.526) (3.990)
-9.283** -13.78*** -11.98***
(4.353) (3.526) (3.990)
Hansen J. Stat 8.245 8.245 3.657 3.657 5.099 5.099
p. value 0.0830 0.0830 0.454 0.454 0.277 0.277
Observations 483 483 483 483 521 521
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
Table 1b-13
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net
property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Set of instruments: GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation,
nominal long term interest rate, private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction variable is
the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level-
are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
62Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-3.056*** -3.049*** -2.811*** -2.803*** -2.722*** -2.716***
(0.328) (0.328) (0.383) (0.383) (0.355) (0.355)
4.826** 4.769*** 5.052***
(1.951) (1.475) (1.706)
4.757** 4.652*** 5.024***
(1.903) (1.427) (1.686)
Hansen J. Stat 4.169 4.157 8.053 8.044 2.446 2.415
p. value 0.384 0.385 0.0896 0.0900 0.654 0.660
Observations 478 478 478 478 515 515
R-squared 0.236 0.237 0.166 0.167 0.139 0.139
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to
beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not
financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential)
GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a
constant and the output gap for each country.Set of instruments: GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation, nominal long
term interest rate, private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction variable is the product of
variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in
parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 2a-12
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-3.062*** -3.061*** -2.775*** -2.772*** -2.665*** -2.660***
(0.330) (0.330) (0.379) (0.379) (0.355) (0.356)
2.788** 4.044*** 4.097***
(1.175) (1.107) (1.282)
2.772** 3.983*** 4.140***
(1.169) (1.095) (1.289)
Hansen J. Stat 4.681 4.679 5.832 6.008 1.197 1.269
p. value 0.322 0.322 0.212 0.199 0.879 0.867
Observations 478 478 478 478 515 515
R-squared 0.233 0.233 0.173 0.172 0.145 0.144
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to
beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not
financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country.Set of instruments: GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation,
nominal long term interest rate, private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction variable is
the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level-
are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 2a-13
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
63Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.986*** -2.986*** -2.810*** -2.686*** -2.686*** -3.506***
(0.318) (0.318) (0.383) (0.348) (0.348) (0.402)
-13.39** -14.54*** -14.58***
(6.231) (4.569) (5.051)
-12.96** -14.59*** -13.14***
(6.050) (5.012) (3.595)
Hansen J. Stat 2.851 2.906 1.937 1.906 3.056 2.889
p. value 0.583 0.574 0.747 0.753 0.548 0.577
Observations 478 478 515 515 479 479
R-squared 0.214 0.214 0.124 0.125 0.185 0.185
Table 2b-12
Dependent variable: Labor Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total
manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and
equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a constant and the
output gap for each country. Set of instruments: GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation, nominal long term interest rate,
private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction variable is the product of variables in
parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All
estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-3.002*** -3.001*** -2.781*** -2.619*** -2.621*** -3.477***
(0.318) (0.317) (0.387) (0.356) (0.356) (0.405)
-7.238** -11.27*** -11.98***
(3.396) (3.457) (3.825)
-7.238** -12.20*** -11.19***
(3.399) (3.851) (3.078)
Hansen J. Stat 6.659 6.666 1.189 1.208 1.756 1.579
p. value 0.247 0.247 0.880 0.877 0.781 0.813
Observations 478 478 515 515 479 479
R-squared 0.209 0.210 0.123 0.123 0.184 0.185
Table 2b-13
Dependent variable: Labor Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total
manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and
equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the regression coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a
constant and the output gap. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Set of instruments for estimations (i)
and (ii): GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation, nominal long term interest rate, nominal short term interest rate, private
credit by banks to GDP. Set of instruments for estimations (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi): GDP per worker, Imports to GDP, CPI inflation,
nominal long term interest rate, private credit to GDP. All instruments are beginning of period values. All estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
64Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.982*** -0.986*** -0.592* -0.590* -0.795** -0.791**
(0.279) (0.279) (0.333) (0.331) (0.379) (0.378)
7.670*** 9.957*** 6.283***
(2.567) (3.072) (2.231)
7.542*** 9.568*** 6.165***
(2.479) (2.906) (2.182)
Hansen J. Stat 9.667 9.266 8.011 7.918 6.733 6.777
p. value (0.0852) (0.0989) (0.156) (0.161) (0.241) (0.238)
Observations 488 488 490 490 539 539
R-squared 0.047 0.050 0.013 0.019 0.033 0.034
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures
not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German,
Scandinavian), District Magnitude, Federal Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period
values. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard
errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the
1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 1a-14
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.941*** -0.943*** -0.586* -0.576* -0.838** -0.830**
(0.283) (0.284) (0.325) (0.325) (0.386) (0.385)
5.726*** 8.815*** 6.814***
(2.172) (2.938) (2.455)
5.802*** 8.754*** 6.899***
(2.182) (2.911) (2.479)
Hansen J. Stat 13.58 13.36 7.090 7.214 6.222 6.304
p. value (0.0185) (0.0202) (0.214) (0.205) (0.285) (0.278)
Observations 488 488 490 490 539 539
R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.016 0.016 0.025 0.025
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures
not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German,
Scandinavian), District Magnitude, Federal Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period
values. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard
errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the
1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 1a-15
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
65Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.769*** -0.771*** -0.281 -0.285 -0.505 -0.509
(0.278) (0.278) (0.329) (0.328) (0.374) (0.374)
-16.80** -21.67** -15.52**
(7.670) (10.42) (7.204)
-16.62** -20.94** -15.31**
(7.471) (9.951) (7.098)
Hansen J. Stat 6.636 6.395 4.563 4.453 2.765 2.821
p. value 0.156 0.172 0.335 0.348 0.598 0.588
Observations 488 488 490 490 539 539
R-squared 0.026 0.027 -0.002 0.000 0.010 0.011
Table 1b-14
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net
property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country.Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German,
Scandinavian), District Magnitude, Federal Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period
values. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard
errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the
1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.740*** -0.743*** -0.255 -0.257 -0.470 -0.471
(0.282) (0.281) (0.321) (0.321) (0.376) (0.375)
-13.40** -18.41** -16.52**
(6.361) (8.601) (7.729)
-13.62** -18.44** -16.86**
(6.409) (8.623) (7.885)
Hansen J. Stat 7.106 7.006 3.937 3.987 2.433 2.513
p. value 0.130 0.136 0.415 0.408 0.657 0.642
Observations 488 488 490 490 539 539
R-squared 0.015 0.016 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.002
Table 1b-15
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net
property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country.Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German,
Scandinavian), District Magnitude, Federal Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period
values. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard
errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the
1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
66Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.635*** -2.629*** -2.454*** -2.446*** -2.383*** -2.381***
(0.430) (0.429) (0.531) (0.530) (0.517) (0.517)
5.751*** 7.797*** 4.234**
(2.184) (2.582) (1.817)
5.596*** 7.464*** 4.134**
(2.110) (2.449) (1.778)
Hansen J. Stat 3.342 3.294 8.111 8.113 7.237 7.298
p. value 0.647 0.655 0.150 0.150 0.204 0.199
Observations 483 483 485 485 529 529
R-squared 0.158 0.160 0.089 0.093 0.101 0.102
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to
beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not
financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential)
GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a
constant and the output gap for each country.Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German, Scandinavian), District
Magnitude, Federal Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period values. The interaction
variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the
country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 2a-14
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.730*** -2.729*** -2.576*** -2.566*** -2.395*** -2.392***
(0.437) (0.437) (0.534) (0.532) (0.521) (0.521)
4.748** 7.281*** 4.728**
(1.868) (2.414) (1.947)
4.777** 7.198*** 4.745**
(1.874) (2.396) (1.968)
Hansen J. Stat 5.433 5.319 6.885 7.038 6.565 6.712
p. value 0.365 0.378 0.229 0.218 0.255 0.243
Observations 483 483 485 485 529 529
R-squared 0.154 0.154 0.101 0.101 0.105 0.105
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to
beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not
financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp.
potential) GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country.Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German,
Scandinavian), District Magnitude, Federal Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period
values. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard
errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the
1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Table 2a-15
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
67Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.558*** -2.557*** -2.494*** -2.394*** -2.392*** -3.127***
(0.406) (0.406) (0.487) (0.483) (0.482) (0.533)
-14.81** -22.13** -14.47**
(6.872) (9.526) (6.347)
-14.57** -14.25** -17.47**
(6.698) (6.248) (8.060)
Hansen J. Stat 2.628 2.456 3.414 3.313 1.986 2.037
p. value 0.622 0.653 0.491 0.507 0.738 0.729
Observations 483 483 529 529 486 486
R-squared 0.144 0.145 0.084 0.084 0.100 0.101
Table 2b-14
Dependent variable: Labor Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Fiscal Balance
to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total
manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and
equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a constant and the
output gap for each country. Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German, Scandinavian), District Magnitude, Federal
Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period values.The interaction variable is the product of
variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in
parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.597*** -2.595*** -2.549*** -2.375*** -2.376*** -3.147***
(0.414) (0.413) (0.497) (0.482) (0.481) (0.538)
-11.95** -19.06** -15.57**
(5.725) (7.948) (6.836)
-12.12** -15.86** -16.30**
(5.769) (6.970) (7.653)
Hansen J. Stat 3.321 3.220 2.365 2.428 1.361 1.475
p. value 0.506 0.522 0.669 0.658 0.851 0.831
Observations 483 483 529 529 486 486
R-squared 0.135 0.135 0.076 0.077 0.099 0.101
Table 2b-15
Dependent variable: Labor Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total
manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and
equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary fiscal balance to (resp.potential) GDP is regressed on a constant and the
output gap for each country. Set of instruments: Legal origin (English, French, German, Scandinavian), District Magnitude, Federal
Political System, Government Centralization. All instruments are beginning of period values.The interaction variable is the product of
variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in
parentheses. All estimations include country and sector dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
68Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.868*** -0.897*** -0.558 -0.587 -1.001** -0.987**
(0.259) (0.254) (0.407) (0.405) (0.458) (0.455)
10.91*** 10.54*** 6.780**
(2.447) (2.462) (2.797)
-4.423 -9.954 -20.37***
(4.357) (7.474) (6.108)
-10.56*** -9.873*** -12.99***
(2.882) (2.243) (2.699)
9.073 11.21 19.20**
(6.815) (6.401) (8.942)
10.90*** 10.22*** 6.967**
(2.333) (2.186) (3.001)
-4.854 -8.256 -19.49***
(4.350) (6.166) (6.065)
-10.84*** -9.999*** -12.58***
(2.909) (2.058) (2.666)
10.32 11.95* 19.54**
(6.886) (6.309) (7.407)
Observations 521 521 523 523 593 593
R-squared 0.582 0.582 0.544 0.544 0.510 0.510
Table 1a-7
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction
of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this
fraction is positive (resp. negative) and is zero otherwise. Gov. Revenues to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) Counter-Cyclicality is the
coefficient of the output gap when total government revenues to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) is regressed on a constant and the output
gap for each country. Gov. Expenditures to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) Pro-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total
government expenditures to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The
interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -
clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
69Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.534 -0.526 -0.0936 -0.0797 -0.491 -0.492
(0.375) (0.376) (0.494) (0.499) (0.488) (0.488)
-19.22*** -17.31** -13.17*
(5.951) (6.192) (7.506)
19.46** 18.44*** 17.72**
(7.643) (5.377) (6.598)
-19.40*** -18.26** -12.81*
(6.135) (6.806) (7.038)
18.80** 17.82*** 18.23**
(7.290) (5.635) (6.541)
Observations 521 521 523 523 593 593
R-squared 0.553 0.553 0.514 0.514 0.472 0.472
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column
for each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real
value added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets
represented by net property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total
Government Revenues (resp. Expenditures) to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when
total government revenues (resp. expenditures) to potential GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each
country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage.
Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies.
Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Gov.
Expenditures to Potential GDP Pro-cyclicality)
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Gov.
Revenues to Potential GDP Counter-cyclicality)
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Table 1b-7
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-cyclicality)
70Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.601*** -2.603*** -2.599*** -2.620*** -2.604*** -2.612***
(0.411) (0.419) (0.402) (0.393) (0.375) (0.383)
8.762*** 10.18*** 7.480***
(1.205) (2.016) (2.234)
-18.12* -25.76** -28.80***
(8.561) (9.262) (4.601)
-7.753*** -7.621*** -9.697***
(1.628) (1.905) (1.822)
19.17* 22.09** 28.56***
(9.435) (8.254) (6.493)
8.927*** 10.61*** 7.079***
(1.288) (2.328) (2.185)
-18.14* -29.14** -30.09***
(8.895) (10.88) (5.456)
-7.728*** -7.687*** -10.40***
(1.571) (1.805) (1.959)
17.38* 21.31** 28.05***
(9.004) (7.821) (7.587)
Observations 516 516 518 518 583 583
R-squared 0.566 0.566 0.507 0.507 0.463 0.463
Table 2a-7
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to
beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction of
capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this
fraction is positive (resp. negative) and is zero otherwise. Total Government Revenues (resp. expenditures) to GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total government revenues (resp. expenditures) to GDP is regressed on a
constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated
coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country
and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Gov.
Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
71Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.558*** -2.555*** -2.449*** -2.447*** -2.283*** -2.273***
(0.472) (0.468) (0.489) (0.486) (0.489) (0.489)
16.99*** 17.66*** 17.96***
(4.236) (4.486) (4.908)
-16.49*** -18.88*** -15.50**
(5.022) (6.277) (6.065)
17.22*** 17.76*** 16.47***
(4.325) (4.747) (4.956)
-16.33*** -18.13*** -16.62**
(4.848) (5.592) (6.320)
Observations 516 516 518 518 583 583
R-squared 0.541 0.543 0.468 0.472 0.417 0.417
Table 2b-7
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Government
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Government
Revenues to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total
manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and
equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Government Revenues to GDP (resp. pot. GDP)
Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total government revenues to GDP (resp. potential GDP) is regressed
on a constant and the output gap for each country. Total Government Expenditures to GDP (resp. potential GDP) Pro-Cyclicality is
the coefficient of the output gap when total government expenditures to GDP (resp. potential GDP) is regressed on a constant and
the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in
percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Government
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Total Government
Expenditures to potential GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
72Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.956*** -0.974*** -0.603 -0.619 -0.899* -0.859*
(0.247) (0.239) (0.417) (0.402) (0.434) (0.436)
5.877*** 5.661** 2.573
(1.301) (2.209) (2.495)
0.217 -3.053 -18.87**
(1.763) (6.585) (6.558)
-10.37*** -10.18*** -11.83***
(2.350) (1.941) (1.686)
8.861 9.607 9.315
(6.578) (6.001) (9.050)
6.101*** 5.364*** 3.060
(1.152) (1.715) (2.619)
-0.0762 -0.888 -16.97**
(1.380) (5.634) (6.810)
-11.42*** -10.88*** -11.64***
(2.671) (1.971) (1.883)
11.59 12.01* 11.40
(7.159) (6.392) (8.310)
Observations 521 521 523 523 572 572
R-squared 0.586 0.589 0.550 0.553 0.532 0.530
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real value
added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction
of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this
fraction is positive (resp. negative) and is zero otherwise. Primary Gov. Revenues to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) Counter-Cyclicality is
the coefficient of the output gap when primary government revenues to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) is regressed on a constant and the
output gap for each country. Primary Gov. Expenditures to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) Pro-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap
when primary government expenditures to GDP (resp. pot. GDP) is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country.
The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Table 1a-8
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
73Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.555 -0.543 -0.119 -0.0996 -0.258 -0.259
(0.372) (0.374) (0.490) (0.502) (0.468) (0.465)
-10.24** -7.717 -7.917
(3.817) (4.677) (8.282)
19.99** 20.46*** 15.38**
(6.729) (5.202) (5.867)
-9.999** -8.876 -7.347
(4.116) (6.090) (7.875)
17.49*** 18.21*** 15.28**
(5.707) (5.093) (5.427)
Observations 521 521 523 523 572 572
R-squared 0.554 0.553 0.517 0.515 0.488 0.488
Table 1b-8
Dependent variable: Real Value Added Growth
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in real value added for the period indicated in each column
for each industry in each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added is the ratio of beginning of period industry real
value added to beginning of period total manufacturing real value added. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets
represented by net property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary
Government Revenues (resp. Expenditures) to GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary
government revenues (resp. expenditures) to GDP is regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The
interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -
clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the
1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Gov.
Expenditures to potential GDP Pro-cyclicality)
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Gov.
Revenues to potential GDP Counter-cyclicality)
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing Value Added
74Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.566*** -2.563*** -2.470*** -2.484*** -2.542*** -2.529***
(0.426) (0.448) (0.423) (0.414) (0.399) (0.406)
5.113*** 6.509*** 4.564**
(0.616) (1.487) (1.686)
-8.227** -11.89* -21.20***
(3.653) (6.416) (6.459)
-7.667*** -7.958*** -9.306***
(1.937) (2.115) (1.097)
20.33* 19.63** 22.09**
(9.755) (8.435) (8.496)
5.024*** 6.915*** 3.917**
(0.725) (1.827) (1.420)
-8.327** -16.05** -23.79***
(3.782) (7.034) (7.211)
-7.086*** -7.529*** -9.675***
(1.699) (1.724) (1.127)
16.26* 16.37** 19.41*
(8.418) (7.365) (9.255)
Observations 516 516 518 518 562 562
R-squared 0.567 0.565 0.508 0.507 0.474 0.478
Table 2a-8
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to pot. GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for
each industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of beginning of period industry labor productivity to
beginning of period total manufacturing labor productivity. Positive (resp. Negative) Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital
expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990 when this fraction is
positive (resp. negative) and is zero otherwise. Primary Government Revenues (resp. Expenditures) to potential GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary government revenues (resp. expenditures) to potential GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses.
Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include
country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to pot. GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Positive Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Negative Financial Dependence and Primary
Gov. Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Estimation Period
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-2.542*** -2.534*** -2.414*** -2.402*** -2.252*** -2.245***
(0.484) (0.477) (0.482) (0.485) (0.505) (0.504)
-7.885** -9.642** -9.865*
(2.998) (4.035) (5.535)
15.52*** 17.80*** 16.16***
(3.940) (3.786) (4.224)
-8.294** -9.013** -11.43*
(2.925) (3.240) (6.138)
17.26*** 19.39*** 15.38***
(4.270) (4.649) (4.545)
Observations 516 516 518 518 562 562
R-squared 0.542 0.544 0.474 0.476 0.426 0.426
Log of Initial Relative Labor Productivity
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Government
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Government
Revenues to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in labor productivity for the period indicated in each column for each
industry in each country. Initial Relative Labor Productivity is the ratio of industry beginning of period labor productivity to total
manufacturing beginning of period labor productivity. Asset Tangibility is the fraction of assets represented by net property, plant and
equipment for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Primary Government Revenues to GDP (resp. pot. GDP)
Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when primary government revenues to GDP (resp. potential GDP) is regressed
on a constant and the output gap for each country. Primary Government Expenditures to GDP (resp. potential GDP) Pro-Cyclicality is
the coefficient of the output gap when primary government expenditures to GDP (resp. potential GDP) is regressed on a constant and
the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in
percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Government
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Asset Tangibility and Primary Government
Expenditures to potential GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Table 2b-8
Dependent variable: Labour Productivity Growth
1980-2005 1985-2005 1990-2005
75Estimation Period: 1987-2005 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.393*** -0.393*** -0.387*** -0.385*** -0.384*** -0.380***
(0.0737) (0.0736) (0.0888) (0.0883) (0.0887) (0.0881)
1.236**
(0.600)
1.301**
(0.602)
-1.601**
(0.549)
0.665
(0.626)
-1.887***
(0.445)
0.0140
(0.447)
-1.733**
(0.574)
0.817
(0.544)
-2.013***
(0.561)
0.148
(0.483)
Observations 258 258 258 258 258 258
R-squared 0.487 0.488 0.487 0.488 0.492 0.491
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in R&D spending for the period 1987-2005 for each industry in
each country. Initial Share in Manufacturing R&D spending is the ratio of beginning of period R&D spending at the industry
level to total manufacturing beginning of period R&D spending. Financial Dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not
financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry for the period 1980-1990. Total Fiscal Balance to (resp. potential)
GDP Counter-Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total fiscal balance to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on a
constant and the output gap for each country. Total (resp. Primary) Gov. Expenditures to (resp. potential) GDP Pro-Cyclicality
is the coefficient of the output gap when total (resp. primary) government expenditures to (resp. potential) GDP is regressed on
a constant and the output gap for each country. Total (resp. Primary) Gov. Revenues to (resp. potential) GDP Counter-
Cyclicality is the coefficient of the output gap when total (resp. primary) government revenues to (resp. potential) GDP is
regressed on a constant and the output gap for each country. The interaction variable is the product of variables in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are in percentage. Standard errors -clustered at the country level- are in parentheses. All estimations include country and industry dummies. Significance at the 1% (resp. 5%; 10%) level is indicated by *** (resp. **; *).
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Gov.
Revenues to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Gov.
Revenues to potential GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Gov.
Expenditures to potential GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Gov.
Expenditures to potential GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Gov.
Expenditures to GDP Pro-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Primary Gov.
Revenues to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Interaction (Financial Dependence and Total Fiscal
Balance to potential GDP Counter-Cyclicality)
Table R&D
Dependent variable: R&D Spending Growth
Log of Initial Share in Manufacturing R&D spending
76